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INTHE 
UT AH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
V. 
OSTON SHILOH F AIRBOURN, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals front. a ~onviction for attempted aggravated 
murder, a first degree felony. This C~urt has jttrisdiction under Utah Code 
section 78A-4-103(2)G) (pour-over jurisdiction). 
INTRODUCTION 
Oston Shiloh Fairbourn and Officer Vincent squared off in the middle 
of a street, Fairbourn holding a knife with a 7-inch blade, and Officer 
Vincent holding a gun. Fairbourn said, "[You're] about to fucking die." The 
two moved slowly down the, s~eet fo_r a few m~1nent~, tracking each other's 
movements. Fa~bourn eventually shifted his knife frmn a forward grip to a 
;reverse grip and. lunged at Officer Vincent. Officer Vincent shot. Fairbourn 
' . . . . ·, 
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three __ times,. stopping but not_ ½ill~g :·him. Fairbourn was convicted of 
atte~p~e? aggrava:~ed murder. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Issue .l: Prosecutorial Misconduct. Investigators approached 
Fairbourn in the hospital and read him his Miranda rights. Fairbourn said he 
wanted to talk to his attorney, but then he began to "talk and talk and talk 
and talk" to the investigators for several minutes. Fairbourn discussed how 
he felt and what he thought when he arrived at the hospital, but the 
sub~tance of what he said is otherwise absent from the record on _appeal. 
Wh~l) Fairbourn ~~stified in his defense at trial, the prosecutor asked him 
why he had not told the _investigators the version of events to which he 
testified at trial-that he was silnply showing Officer Vincent that he had a 
• • • : ~ • J ; • • • ' • 
knife, and that he stepped forward in an attempt to surrender. 
. . . . . . . . : 
The proseet~tor also asked Officer Vincen~ what ~as going th!ough 
his mind when he squared off with Fairpourn. Officer Vincent tes~ified that 
his thoughts shifted to his family, who dependec:1 on hhn, and that he went 
into survival mode, focusing on "making it h01n_e at the end of the night." 
T!1e prosecutor referred obliquely to ~his testim?ny iJ:1 closing argum.ent, 
~ta ting briepy that Officer Vincent was concerne~ he was_ going to die. 
-2-
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Finally, noting the differences in testimony presented by Fairbourn 
and other eyewitnesses, the prosecutor asked Fairbourn if the differences 
were "just a n1isunderstanding" on the part of the other witnesses. 
Fairbourn responded. by explaining that there could be other explanations 
for differences in testimony, such as the eyewitnesses' different vantage 
points. 
Was it obviously improper and prejudicial for the prosecutor to (1) 
ask Fairbourn why he did not tell his story to investigators then refer 
briefly to that omission in closing argument, (2) adduce and briefly argue 
evidence about what Officer Vincent was thinking during the incident, or 
(3) highlight discrepancies between Fairbourn' s testimony and the 
testimony of several eyewitnesses? 
Standard of Review. Preserved prosecutorial misconduct claim.s are 
reviewed for abuse of discretion, but unpreserved claims are reviewed for 
plain error. State v. Jones, 2015 UT 19, if 13, 345 P.3d 1195 (unpreserved); State 
v. Kohl, 2000 UT 35, ii22, 999 P.2d 7 (preserved). 
Issue II: Admissibility. Officer Vincent testified that in police officer 
training, he was taught that a knife-wielding assailant within a 21-foot 
r~dius of a polic_e officer could successfully attack before the officer is able 
• ••I •, . ( • 
to fh~e a gun. Defense counsel _had objected based on relevance and the need 
-3-
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for expert testimo_ny but withdrew his ~xpert-testimony _objection after the 
prosec1:1tor _and_ witness agreed- at defense counsel's suggestion- to limit 
the __ testimony to what Officer Vincent was taught and not address the 
• ' • • ·•, •: •' • T 
scientific accuracy of the 21-foot rule. 
Was the police officer's lay testi_mony about what he was told in 
police officer training admissible to provide context for the State's case? 
Standard of Review. To the extent Fairbourn waived his objection or 
invited any error, his claims are unreviewable. State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 
1275, 1285 (Utah 1989). Otherwise, they are reviewed for abuse of discretion. 
Tr~al col:lrts are given considerable latitude in determining whether to admit 
or exclude testimony from both lay witnesses and experts; such rulings are 
therefore reviewed for abuse of discretion. State v. Perea, 2013 UT 68, if if 30-
31, 32~ P.3d 624. The same standard applies for reviewing a trial court's 
d~termination of. whether specific testimony qualifies as lay or ~~pert 
testimony. State v. Rothlisberger, 2006 UT 49, ,I8, 147 P.3d 1176. Similarly, 
trial courts have broad discretion in determining whether evidence . is 
-4-
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relevant and those rulings are likewise reviewed for abuse of discretion. 
State v. Fedorowicz, 2002 UT 67, ~32, 52 P.3d 1194. 1 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following rules are reproduced in Addendum A: 
• Utah Rules of Evidence 401, 402, and 403. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A jury convicted Fairbourn of attempted aggravated murder. R199. 
He was sentenced to five years to life in prison. R241-42. Fairbourn alleges 
prosecutorial misconduct and evidentiary error during his trial. 
A. Summary off acts. 
Fairbourn was walking across a busy street one winter evening. The 
hand signal for the crosswalk was flashing red when Fairbourn started into 
the street without looking either way. This caught Officer Vincent's 
1 Fairbourn suggests that admissibility rulings are reviewed for 
correctness. Aplt. Br. at 10. The authority on which Fairbourn relies finds its 
origins in State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d. 774 (Utah 1991), where the supreme 
court stated, "Whether a piece of evidence is admissible is a question of law, 
and we always review questions of law under a correctness standard." Id. at 
781 n.3. But the supreme court later disavmved the second half of that 
declaration. It recognized that while admissibility is ultimately a question of 
law, the particular standard of revie,v to be applied depends on how much 
discretion the trial court is granted in deciding- the particular issue. See State 
v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1271 (Utah 1993). As noted above, trial courts are 
granted significant discretion in deciding the questions here. 
-5-
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attention because he thought it showed a "disregard for [Fairbourn's] own 
. safety." R263:94-95. 
Officer ViJ:lcei1tpulled his ~ar into· a nearby gas station parking lot to 
. ' "•·, ' 
continue ·wakhmg Fairbourn. R263:95-97. When Fairbourn saw Officer 
Vir1cent' s car, he entered the same park~ng lot but just stood there. R263:96. 
Faitbourn faced Officer Vincent, and Officer Vincent noticed that 
Fairbourn's face seemed fixated on som.ething, and his lips were moving as 
if he were saying something. R263:97-99. Officer Vincent "felt that maybe 
he had an issue with me." R263:102. 
Fairbourn then walked into the middle of the street, stopped, and 
turned to face Officer Vincent as if to goad him into contact. R263:102-03. 
Officer Vincent called for a single-officer backup t~en pulled his car into the 
stree~, overhea~ lights on, to block traffic. R263:104-05. 
As Officer Vincent was getting o~ t of his car, Fairbourn drew a knife 
with a 7-inch blade and said, "[You're] about to fucking die." R263:105-
06,110-11,120;SE9. Fairbourn held the ~nife in a forward grip,2 "ready to 
2 A forward grip means holding the knife so the blade extends from 
the hand near the thumb. In contrast, a reverse grip means holding the knife 
so -the blade extends from the hand near the- little finger. See Wikipedia, 
Kn~fe fight, https:/ / en.wikipedia.org/w /index.php?title=Knife_fight&oldid 
=727491575 (as of June 29, 2016, 09:48 UTC). 
-6-
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go," with his upper arm next to his side and his forearm pointing forward 
so that his upper- and forearm formed a 90-degree angle. R263:106-07. 
After callin·g for more backup, Officer Vihcent drew his gun and told 
. .. 
Fairboum to drop the knife. R263:107-08. He did not. R263:108. Fairbourn 
began to move to the side, and Office Vincent moved parallel to him so 
Fairbourn could not attack from the side. R263:32,109. One eyewimess 
,, . 
described Fairbourn as moving weight from one foot to the other, "kind of 
dancing around." R263:62-63. Officer Vincent continued to tell Fairbourn to 
drop the knife, but Fairbourn refused. R263:110. After about thirty seconds 
of walking parallel to Officer Vincent, Fairbourn turned and started to rn.ove 
quickly away, with Officer Vincent following, but Fairbourn soon stopped 
and turned to face Office Vincent again. R263:47-48,63,67,76,78-79,109. 
Fai.rbourn stepp~d _toward Officer Vincent, who told Fairbourn to stop. 
R263:113-14. Instead of stopping, Fairbourn switched his knife from a 
forward grip to a reverse grip, raised_ his forea~m so his hand ~as near his 
head, with the knife pointing forward, and took another step. ~263:35-
36,63-64,79,114-15. When Officer Vincent told him to stop again, Fairbourn 
~ 7-
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"lunged" at him. R263:36-37,39-40,63-65,68,115. 3 Officer Vincent shot 
Fairbourn three times, stopping but not killing him. R263:115,143;R264:8. 
B. Summary of proceedings. 
The State charged Fairbourn with attempted aggravated murder, the 
aggravating factor being Officer Vinc~nt' s status as a law enforcement 
officer.4 Rl,110. See Utah Code Ann. §76-5-202(1)(m) (West 2015). 
Fairbourn was tried before a jury. The State called Officer Vincent; 
Officer Fife, who responded to Officer Vincent's call for back-up; Detective 
Sanders, who tried to interview Fairbourn at the hospital; and five civilian 
eyewitnesses. 
Fairbourn testified in his own defense. In his version, he explained 
that he was heading to a nearby house where he had spent the previous 
night. R264:50-5L Because he was unsure where that house was, he woul_d 
. ~ , -
walk a fe~.v p~ces in the gas statior:i parking lot then switch directions, trying 
to · decide whether to go to his grandmother's nearby house instead. 
R264:51-54. Fairbourn then walked into the middle of the street, and after 
3 Two eyewitnesses described - Fairbourn' s motion as a lunge. 
Eyewitnesses also described Fairbourn' s motion as II approaching" 11 in a 
forward motion," R263:24, "kind of scooting forward . . . but not really 
stepping," R263:41, moving in "a fast walk," R263:80, and, as Officer 
Vincent described it, as having "stepped," R263:115. 
4 The State originally charged Fairbourn with four additional offenses, 
but those were all dropped. Rl, 110. 
--8-
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he noticed the police car pull into the street with its lights on, he turned· and 
began walking down the street, away from the car.5 R264:55-57,60. Looking 
over his shoulder, Fairbourn saw Officer Vincent outside his car, with his 
hand on his grin. R264:57,60-61. 
Fairbourn was moving quickly., so he was having trouble keeping the 
large knife in his pocket. R264:61. He took the knife out, holding it with his 
right hand near his waist, and holding his baggy pants up with his left 
hand. R264:61-63. Realizing he could be charged with fleeing a police 
officer, Fairbourn stopped an~ turr~ed to fa.ce Officer Yincent. R264:62. 
Officer Vin.cent told him to show his hands. R264:62-63. Fairbourn raised 
his right hand until it was about shoulder height, still holding the knife.6 
. . . 
R264:62-64. Fairbourn said he held his hand out with the knife as if he were 
"surrendering." R264:64. He took two steps back then heard a gunshot and 
everything went black. R264:64,71. 
After deliberating for over rune hours, the jury returned. a guilty 
verdict. R163,199-201. The court sentenced Fairbourn to an indeterminate 
5 One of the eyewitnesses also .described Fairbourn as walking avvay 
from the police car when Officer Vincent got out of the car. R263:47-48. 
Officer Vincent acknowledged that F~irbourn ''-probably'' took "one or two 
steps" to the side when Officer Vincent was pulling into the street, but if he 
did, ".it wasn't very much." R.263:105. 
6 One eyewitness who did not see the knife said that Fairbourn was 
holding his hand in front of himself, palm up and open. R263:49, 52. 
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term of five years to life in prison. R241-42. Fairbourn timely appealed .. 
R241-42,251. 
.SUMMARY OF ·ARGUM·ENT 
I. Fairbourn asserts three claims of prosecutorial misconduct. First, he 
contends that the prosecutor improperly questioned him about not telling 
an investigator his exculpatory trial version of the events and improperly 
• ' f 
comn1ented on that failure in closing argument. He says this violated the 
rule in Doyle v. Ohio. 
Fairbourn did not preserve this claim. _He objecteci only. to the 
prosecutor's closing argument, and then based only on alleged burden-
shifting- not based on Doyle error. Fairbourn thu._s must prove plain error to 
, . 
prevail, but he cannot. Doyle protects ag_ainst the ~undamental unfairness of 
breaching the in1plicit assurance in Miranda warnings that a person's silence 
will not be used against him. Thus, Doyle error. cannot exist if ~ Miranda 
w~r~g does not induce a defendant to remain silent. Because Fairbourn 
waived his right to remain silent by talking to Detective Sanders, the 
prosecutor's questions and argument were not fundamentally unfair under 
D~yle. But even if Fairbourn did not ':"'aive his right to remain silent, no 
Doyle error occurred because Utah courts . have h_eld that Doyle's 
fundamental fairness guarantee is not violated when the prosecutor does 
-10-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
not substantially use the defendant's silence or the jury would not have 
. naturally and necessarily understood the prosecutor's arguments as 
referring to the defendant's exercise of his right to remain silent. Although 
• ' 1 : • • ' • -• • 
the prosecutor asked several questions about Fairbourn' s hospital 
interview, he referred to it only briefly in closing argument. Furthermore, 
because Fairbourn actually spoke to investigators, the jury would not 
naturally and necessarily have construed the argument as a comment on 
silence. 
Second, Fairbourn contends that the prosecutor improperly asked 
Officer Vir1cent what he was thinking as he faced off against Fairbourn. 
Officer Vincent responded that his t~oughts turned to survival and to his 
family, and the prosecutor referred ~o Officer Vincent's fear in his. closing 
argument. Fair~ourn argues th~t the questions and argument inflamed the 
jury because it made them sympathetic to Officer Vincent and his family. 
He al~o argue_s_ th~t the prosecutor committ~d misconduct because the 
evidence was irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial under rule 403, Utah Rules 
of Evidence. Fairbourn concedes that these arguments must be reviewed for 
plain error. 
Fairbourn cannot show plain error because prosecutors may properly 
adduce evidence of and argue about a victim's state of mind when that 
-11.-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
victim appears as a witness at trial and the evidence and argument go to the 
victim-witness's credibility or the plausibility of his story. Officer Vincent's 
testimony did so here, with his mental and emotional response to the 
incident establishing the plausibility of his teslim.ony that Fairbourn was 
threatening to kill him. And given the caselaw approving of references to 
victim-witnesses' state of mind, any error could not have been obvious. 
Further, forfeited evidentiary arguments caru1ot support a 
prosecutorial-misconduct clailn. Due process does not require prosecutors 
to predict whether evidence that is not objected to will ultimately be 
deemed inadmissible. Rather, absent a ruling that evidence is inadmi~sible, 
. . 
prosecutors do not violate due process by bringing to the jury's attention 
evidence that is admitted but later founc_l on appeal to be inadmissible. 
Third, .. Fairbourn contends that the pros_ecutor improperly asked 
Fairbourn to comment on other witne~ses' veracity. Fairbourn concedes that 
this claim must also be reviewed for plain error. 
Fairbourn cannot show plain error because the prosecutor asked 
Fairbourn to n1erely clarify a discrepancy in the evidence, which is 
perm~ssible. To the extent the prosecutor's g_uestion exceeded those 
permissible bounds, it did not obviously do so. 
-12-
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Finally, Fairbourn argues that all of the instances of prosecutorial 
misconduct combined to prejudice him. His argument implicitly concedes 
that no alleged error standing alone would justify reversal- with the 
exception of the alleged Doyle error, for which Fairbourn makes a separate 
prejudice argument. But even if this_ Court concludes that the questions and 
cmnments were improper, the trial court's failure to intervene was 
harmless. The trial court cautioned the jury not to base its decision on 
sympathy for either party. It also cautioned the jury that different witnesses 
can honestly ren1ember the same event differently- and Fairbourn' s 
response to the prosecutor's question about di_screpancies in the testimony 
alerted the ju;·y to that fact. Furthermore, each instance of alleged 
rnisconduct was brief, the evidence against Fairbourn was strong-
including direct evidence and corroborated circumstantial evidence_-and 
def~nse counsel urged the jury at length not to infer guilt from Fairbourn' s 
failure to con1e . forward wit0 his story before trial. Thus,. viewed 
individually and in the aggregate, th~ alleged instances of n1isconduct were 
harmless. 
II. Fairbourn next contends that the h·ial court erroneously admitt~d 
evidence of the "21-foot rule" - that a knife-wielding assail~nt w~thin ~ 2~ -
foot radius of a police officer could successfully attack before the officer is 
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able to fire a gun. Fairbourn argues that the testimony required an expert 
witness and was not relevant because it related to the victin1' s state of mind, 
which is not an element of the charged offense. 
Fairbourn waived his expert-testimony argument by suggesting a 
limitation to the prosecutor's question and stating that the lin1itation would 
resolve his objection. But in any event, expert testimony was not needed 
. ' . 
because Officer Vincent testified only to what the 21-foot rule is and the fact 
that he was taught it. He did not testify to its accuracy. Furthermore, the fact 
that Officer Vinc_ent was taught the 21-f~ot rule provided relevant evidence 
of Officer Vincent's state of mind, _which provided context for the 
circumstances surrounding the offense and explained why Officer Vincent 
shot Fairbourn. 
Fairbourn implicitly r-oncedes that any error on this _point is not 
prejudicial without the cumulative effect of every other alleged_ error. But 
• • • I ~ 
the brief reference to the 21-foot rule does not change the prejudice analysis. 
Neither party re!erred to the 21-.foot ru~e in closi~g argu1nent, and adding 
Officer Vincent's two-sentence reference to the prejudice calculus does not 
increase the likelihood of a more favorable result for Fairbourn. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
The prosecutor did not commit misconduct because 
Fairbourn was not silent in his hospital interview, 
prosecutors may ask victirns about their state of mind 
to establish their credibility as witnesses, and the 
prosecutor did not ask Fairbourn whether other 
witnesses were lying. 
To prove prosecutorial misconduct, Fairboum must prove both that 
the prosecutor's questions ·or coinrnents were. i~prbper and. that they 
prejudiced the defendant. A prosecutor may not "call to the attention of the 
jurors matters they would not be justified in considering in determining 
their verdict." State v. Tillman, 75Q P.2d 546, 555 (Utah 1987). But a 
prosecutor's impropriety is prejudicial and warrants reversal only if there is 
a "reasonable likelihood" of "a ·1more favorable result" absent the 
impropriety. Id. 
Fairbourn argues prosecutorial misconduct based on (1) an alleged 
violation of the proscription in Doyl~ v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976), against 
in.1peaching a defendant's trial testimony with his post-Miranda-warning 
silence, (2) questions and c01nn1ents about Officer Vincent's state of 1nind, 
and (3) questions allegedly asking Faj.rbourn to comment on the veracity of 
~ther witnesse~. Fairbourn concedes that his second and third prosecutorial 
misconduct clahns areynpreserved. Aplt. Br. at 10, 19. His first cla!m is also 
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unpreserved. Thus, for each prosecuforial-misconduct claim, Fairbourn 
must prove obvious, prejudicial error. State v. Bond, 2015 UT 88, ,r,r41-46, 
361 P;3d 104; State v. Dunn,850 P.2d·1201, 1208 (Utah 1993). 
Fairbourn cannot prove that the prosecutor's questions and 
comments were improper, that any impropriety would have been obvious 
to the tr!al court, _or ~a~ he was_prejudiced by any alleged impr_o_priety. 
A. The prosecutor did not impeach Fairbourn's trial 
testimony with Fairbourn's post-Miranda-warning 
silence because Fairbourn did not remain silent. 
Fairbourn contends that the prosecutor improperly (1) asked him 
why he had not told his exculpatory story to Detective Sanders when 
Sanders interviewed Fairbourn at the hospital, then (2) referred to that 
testimony in closing argument. Aplt. Br. at 20-23. Fairbourn argues that the 
prosecutor's questioning and con1rn.ent equated ·to an improp_er a tte1npt to 
"draw[] the jurors' attention to a defendant's post-arrest silence." Aplt. Br. 
at 2.0. He argues that because the "prohibition on using a criminal 
defendant's post-arrest silence for impeachmenf purposes" has been clear 
since the Supre1ne Court's 1976 decision in Doyle, any error should have 
. . : . 
been obvious. ~plt. Br. at 23. 7 
7 A violation of Doyle can constitute trial court error or prosecutorial 
misconduct. Compare Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 761-65 (1987), with id. at 
765-67. ·Fairbourn alleg.es only prosecutorial misconduct. · 
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Fairbourn did not preserve his arguments. He objected only to the 
prosecutor's closing argument, and he objected based only on burden-
shiftin·g, not Doyle error. Thus, this claim must be rev_iewed for plain. error. 
. . 
Fairbourn cannot pr_ove obvious error. 
1. Background Facts 
Detective Sanders interviewed Fairbourn at the hospital several 
weeks after the incident. R264:26-27. Fairbourn· said he invoked his Mfranda 
rights, but continued to talk- and Detective Sanders simply listened- for 
about seven minutes. R264:87,133. The record is silent as to what Fairbourn 
said, with one exception: Detective Sanders testified that Fairbourn said that 
"when he arrived at the hospital he thought he was dead and he felt that he 
was in hell." R264:26. 
On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked Fairbourn, "You didn't 
say anything to him about this misunderstanding of you trying to surrender 
to Officer Vincent when Officer Sanders talked to you at the hospital, did 
you?" R264:73. When Fairbourn said no, the prosecutor followed up: "So 
today in court talking to this jury here, nine 1nonths after this happened is 
the first time that we're hearing that you were trying to surrender to Officer 
Vincent, right?" R264:73. Fairbourn admitted to the question, but on re-
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direct, defense counsel elicited testimony that Fairbourn was on morphine 
at the time and "was real delusional." R264:75. 
The prosecutor recalled Detective Sanders. Detective Sanders testified 
that he first tried to interview Fairbourn twelve days after the incident, but 
Fairbourn was about to go into surgery. R264:86,92. Detective Sanders said 
that when he returned later and interviewed Fairboum, he "seemed a lot 
more awake, aware of the surroundings," and did not appear to be 
impaired. R264:86-87. The prosecutor asked again whether Fairbourn said 
anything "about attempting to surrender to Officer Vincent" and asked 
whether Fairbourn said anything "about having a knife" or "about having 
baggy pants that he couldn't hold up." R264:88. Detective Sanders replied 
that he had not. R264:88. 8 
In closing, the prosecutor argued, "First of all, everything that the 
defendant told you today, he had the chance to say before. When he was 
talking to Officer Fife at the scene, he had an interview with Officer Sanders 
after-" R264:102. At that point, defense couns~l objected. R264:102. He 
argued that by asserting that Fairbourn "should have come forward with 
information," the prosecutor's closing argument "shifts the burden of 
8 On appeal, Fairbourn does not challenge any of the prosecutor's 
questions to Detective Sanders. 
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proof." R264:103. The trial court responded that burden-shifting and 
commenting on Fairbourn's "prior statements" to the investigator were 
"two different things." R264:103. The trial court suggested that Fairbourn's 
objection really went to the latter: "I think what you are saying is ... the 
defendant had a Fifth Amendment right to remain silent." R264:103. 
Defense counsel implicitly rejected the trial court's characterization. 
R264:103. Instead of addressing Fairbourn' s right to remain silent, he 
reasserted his burden-shifting claim: "He has no obligation to come forward 
with evidence. And it's improper to suggest that he had .... And I think 
that's what this argument suggests is he's supposed to come forward." 
R264:103. The trial court rejected Fairbourn' s burden-shifting argument, 
ruling that the statement was permissible because it simply referred to the 
evidence and addressed whether Fairbourn's statements to the investigator 
and at trial were credible and consistent. R264:105. When the prosecutor 
resumed his argument before the jury, he did not return to the point. 
R.264:105. 
Defense counsel, however, responded at length to the prosecutor's 
reference to the interview. He told jurors to use their common sense to 
determine whether Fairbourn was in good enough condition to be 
interviewed just days after a major surgery. R264:116-17. He argued that 
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Fairbourn "doesn't have any obligation to come forward" with evidence. 
R264:117. He criticized the prosecutor's implication that "because he didn't 
come forward with all this _evidence[- ]his statement, his explanation of 
how he got the knife, or his pants were baggy[ - ]that he must be guilty," 
emphasizing that that "isn't how our system works." R264:117. He also 
pointed out that Detective Sanders never asked Fairbourn any questions 
that would have elicited the statements the prosecutor was now criticizing 
Fairbourn for failing to give. R264:117. Defense counsel then concluded his 
attack on the prosecutor's comment: 
[T]his is his day in court. This is his opportunity to tell you his 
side of the story, you know. And then because he does that, 
it's some sort of penalty that's supposed to apply. Are you 
supposed to not believe him or have some sort of lack of 
credibility? Our system does not work that way. 
R264:117-18. 
After the jury began deliberations, the parties continued to argue 
whether referring to the hospital interview was burden-shifting. R264:131-
35. The prosecutor proffered that in the hospital interview, Fairbourn 
"attempts to invoke his Miranda rights a couple of times and keeps talking 
to the officers. The officers aren't asking him questions. They were sitting 
there listening to him for seven minu t~s, talk and talk and talk and talk. 
Even after l~e saf d I think I ought to have a lawyer." R264:133. The 
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prosecutor stated that he had deliberately not put evidence before the jury 
that Fairbourn had attempted to invoke his Miranda rights because he 
recognized the impropriety of doing so. R264:133. The trial court reiterated 
its ruling that the argument did not involve burden-shifting and was 
permissible because it simply addressed Fairbourn' s credibility. R264:134-
35. 
2. Fairbourn's Doyle claim is unpreserved because 
Fairbourn did not object to the prosecutor's cross-
examination about Fairbourn's hospital interview and 
objected to the prosecutor's argument about the interview 
on grounds other than Doy le. 
To preserve an objection for appellate review, "[t]he issue must be 
raised to a level of consciousness that allows the trial court an adequate 
opportunity to address it." State v. Worwood, 2007 UT 47, ~16, 164 P.3d 397 
(internal quotation marks omitted). Doing so requires the defendant to 
make a "specific objection." State v. Pinder, 2005 UT 15, ~45, 114 P.3d 551. To 
be specific, "the grounds for the objection must be distinctly and specifically 
stated." State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1144 (Utah 1989); see also State v. 
Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1363 n.12 (Utah 1993) ("Trial counsel must state 
clearly and specifically all grounds for objection."). The specificity 
requirement of the preservation rule "arises out of the trial court's need to 
assess allegations by isolating relevant facts and considering them in the 
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context of the specific legal doctrine placed at issue." State v. Winfield, 2006 
UT 4, if 27, 128 P.3d 1171 (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, a litigant 
must also present "supporting evidence" and "relevant legal authority." 
State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 361 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
For example, in State v. Brown, a defendant challenged the 
constitutionality of the statute under which he was charged, identifying the 
specific provision that was allegedly unconstitutional and citing due 
process. Id. at 360. This Court held that the defendant had not preserved, 
among other issues, a due-process claim of selective enforcement. Id. at 360-
61. Despite the defendant's citation to due process below, the Court 
explained that the defendant "did not bring to the trial court's conscious 
awareness or attention" his selective-enforcement claim, because defendant 
made only "mere allusion to police misconduct" and "introduced no 
supporting evidence or legal authority relevant to selective prosecution." Id. 
at 361. See also Larsen, 865 P.2d at 1363 n.12 (holding that a challenge based 
on rule 702, Utah Rules of Evidence, does not preserve a challenge to that 
same evidence based on rule 403); State v. Mitchell, 2013 UT App 289, ,147, 
318 P.3d 238 (holding that a challenge based on rules 401 and 402, Utah 
Rules of Evidence, does not preserve a challenge to that same evidence 
based on rules 403 or 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence). 
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Fairbourn did not give the trial court sufficient warning that he 
thought the prosecutor violated Doyle. Fairbourn never objected to the 
prosecutor's cross-examination about Fairbourn withholding, under post-
Miranda-warning questioning, the exculpatory explanation he gave at trial. 
R264:73. 
Fairbourn's objection to the prosecutor's closing argument was 
insufficiently specific to preserve a Doyle claim. He did not cite Doyle or its 
progeny. He did not present supporting evidence, such as a proffer of what 
Fairbourn said in his hospital interview. He did not argue that the 
prosecutor's arguments violated the _Doyle proscription against using post-
Miranda silence to impeach exculpatory trial testimony. He argued only that 
any reference to his silence effectively shifted the burden of proof. 
R264:102-05,131-35. 
But a burden-shifting claim does not equate with a Doyle claim. Doyle 
recognized a specific, narrow due process violation: It is "fundamentally 
unfair and a deprivation of due process to allow the arrested person's 
silence to be used to impeach an explanation subsequently offered at trial" 
when the government has given an implicit assurance-through Miranda 
warnings-that "silence will carry no penalty." Doyle, 426 U.S. at 618; accord 
Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 763 (1987); Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 606-07 
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(1982); Anderson v. Charles, 447 U.S. 404, 407-08 (1980). Burden-shifting does 
not appear as a rationale in any Doyle decision from the United States 
Supreme Court, the Utah Supreme Court, or the Utah Court of Appeals. 
Burdens of proof in a criminal trial and the prohibition on using a 
defendant's post-Miranda-warning silence are both dictated by the 
fundamental fairness guarantee of the Due Process Clause. See Doyle, 426 
U.S. at 618; In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 359, 364 (1970). But that common 
thread does not make asserting one violation sufficient to preserve an 
objection to the other. If it were sufficient, then objecting to a prosecutor's 
comments based on any fundamental fairness argu1nent-for example, a 
prosecutor expressing his personal opinion that the defendant was lying, see 
State v. Davis, 2013 UT App 228, ~35, 311 P.3d 538-would be sufficient to 
preserve an objection that the same comments violated Doyle. But an 
objection to a personal opinion about veracity would not alert the trial court 
that the real complaint was using post-Miranda silence to impeach trial 
testimony. See, e.g., Brown, 856 P.2d at 360-61 (concluding that reference to 
due process was not sufficient to preserve every due process argmnent on 
appeal). 
In fact, Fairbourn implicitly told the h·ial court he was not raising a 
Doyle issue. When Fairbourn objected that the comments shifted the State's 
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burden to defendant, the h·ial court offered that the real objection was the 
prosecutor commenting on Fairbourn's waiver of his right to remain silent. 
But Fairbourn implicitly rejected the h·ial court's suggestion and instead 
doubled down on his burden-shifting objection. R264:103.9 
In sum, Fairbourn did not preserve his Doyle claim. He never objected 
to the prosecutor's cross-examination about Fairboum's hospital interview. 
And even though he objected to the prosecutor's argument about the 
interview, he not only failed to argue Doyle in support, he implicitly rejected 
any Miranda-based objection in favor of his burden-shifting argument. This 
Court should therefore review Fairbourn' s Doyle claims only for plain error. 
3. The prosecutor did not plainly violate the Doyle 
proscription against using post-Miranda silence to 
impeach exculpatory trial testimony because Fairbourn 
did not remain silent. 
Doyle's proscription is premised on fundamental fairness: It is unfair 
for the government to tell a defendant that he does not have to talk to 
police, implicitly promising not to use his silence to impeach testimony he 
later gives at h·ial, then turn around and do exactly that. But where, as here, 
9 Even if Fairbourn' s burden-shifting argument related indirectly to 
Doyle, his objection was not sufficient to preserve the arguments he now 
raises on appeal. A "general objection," "oblique reference," or "mere 
allusion" to an issue is not sufficient to preserve it for appeal. Brown, 856 
P.2d at 361. 
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the Miranda warnings do not induce silence, there is no Doyle error because 
the government breached no promise. 
As noted, Doyle held that when the government has given an implicit 
assurance that "silence will carry no penalty," it is "fundamentally unfair 
and a deprivation of due process to allow the arrested person's silence to be 
used to impeach an explanation subsequently offered at trial." 426 U.S. at 
618. But because the due process violation rests on the fundamental 
unfairness of breaching an implied assurance, there is no violation when a 
defendant "has not been induced to remain silent." Anderson, 447 U.S. at 
408; see also Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284, 291-92 (1986) (describing 
the fundamental unfairness in terms of the government "breaching the 
implied assurance of the Miranda warnings"). Likewise, there is no Doyle 
error when the State impeaches a defendant's h·ial testimony with pre-
Miranda-warning silence-either pre- or post-arrest. See Fletcher, 455 U.S. at 
606-07; Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 239-40 (1980). And "a defendant 
who voluntarily speaks after receiving Miranda warnings has not been 
induced to remain silent." Anderson, 447 U.S. at 408. In these situations, 
there is no fundamental unfairness because the government has not induced 
silence through an implicit promise not to use it against the defendant. 
Fletcher, 455 U.S. at 606-07; Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 239-40; see also Anderson, 447 
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U.S. at 408 (stating that Doyle requires "silence maintained after receipt of 
governmental assurances"). 
Fairbourn did not remain silent. He purported to invoke his right to 
an attorney, then proceeded without prompting to "talk and talk and talk 
and talk" while Detective Sanders merely listened. R264:133. He therefore 
waived rather than invoked his right to remain silent. See Berghuis v. 
Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 384, 386 (2010) (holding that a defendant waives his 
right to remain silent when Miranda warnings are given, defendant 
understood them, and defendant engages in "course of conduct indicating 
waiver" such as making uncoerced statements to police). Because he waived 
his right to re1nain silent, the State broke no promise not to use his silence 
against him by arguing that he withheld his exculpatory version of events 
until he testified at trial. See State v. Velarde, 675 P.2d 1194, 1195-96 (Utah 
1984) (per curiam) 10 (holding that Doyle does not apply when a defendant 
10 The Utah Supreme Court's decision in State v. Velarde remains good 
law even though Velarde ultimately obtained habeas relief in federal court. 
See Velarde v. Shulsen, 757 F.2d 1093, 1095-96 (10th Cir. 1985) (per curiam) 
(stating, based on State's concession,· that Doyle error occurred at trial, but 
deciding case based on conclusion that conceded error was not harmless). 
Any dicta about Doyle error in that case does not undermine the validity of 
the rule adopted by the Utah Supreme Court. See, e.g., Bromley v. Crisp, 561 
F.2d 1351, 1354 (10th Cir. 1977) (en bane) (stating that state courts are free to 
11 express their differing views" on federal questions "until we are all guided 
by a binding decision of the Supreme Court"). · 
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waives his right to remain silent "by ta~king freely with [an] officer" 11right 
after hearing the Miranda admonition"). 11 
And even if this Court concludes that Fairbourn did not waive his 
right to remairt silent, due process prohibits only the prosecutor's 
deliberate, "substantial" use of a defendant's exercise of his right to silence, 
not the "mere mention" of it. State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262, 268 (Utah 1998); 
accord State v. Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, 'if 67, 979 P.2d 799; see also Greer, 483 U.S. 
at 763-64 ( explaining that "the Due Process Clause bars the use for 
impeachment purposes of a defendant's postarrest silence," and concluding 
there was no Doyle error because trial c_ourt did not permit such use 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). Here, the prosecutor certainly intended 
to use F airbourn' s hospital interview to impeach his testimony and asked 
several questions about it. But his actual use of that interview was cut short 
11 In State v. McCallie, this Court rejected the State's argument that a 
defendant's unambiguous invocation of his right to remain silent is a 
prerequisite to Doyle error, reasoning that the Supreme Court has 
"distinguished Fifth Amendment right-to-remain-silent cases from due 
process comment-on-silence cases." 2016 UT App 4, ifif23-26, 369 P.3d 103, 
petition for cert. pending. But even if this Court were to find a formal waiver 
analysis under Miranda to be inapplicable, Supreme Court precedent is clear 
that Doyle does not apply when, as here, the defendant's silence has not, in 
fact, been induced. See Wainwright, 474 U.S. at 291-92; Fletcher, 455 U.S. at 
606-07; Anderson, 447 U.S. at 408; Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 239-40; accord Velarde, 
675 P.2d at 1195-96; State v. Maas, 1999 UT App 325, ,J,I4, 24, 991 P.2d 1108; 
State v. Harrison, 805 P.2d 769, 788 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
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by defense counsel's objection during closing argument. R264:102. The 
prosecutor's use, therefore, was not substantial. Thus, there was no Doyle 
violation. 
Furthermore, there is no Doyle error when a jury would not naturally 
and necessarily construe the questions and argument as referring to the 
defendant's exercise of his right to remain silent rather than the consistency 
of his story over time. See Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, if 67 (finding no Doyle error 
when "jury would not likely have construed this testimony as commenting 
on defendant's silence"); Tillman, 750_ P.2d at 554 (applying similar rule in 
related context of prosecutor making indirect comment on defendant's 
failure to testify). This Court held in State v. McCallie that when dealing with 
cases where a defendant makes statements to police but those statements 
are treated as silence for purposes of Doyle, a lay jury will not "naturally 
and necessarily" understand the prosecutor's questioning and argument to 
refer to the defendant's exercise of his right to remain silent. 2016 UT App 4, 
"if29, 369 P.3d 103 (discussing natural-and-necessary-construction rule in 
context of prejudice), petition for cert. pending. 
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That is what happened here. 12 The jury was aware that Fairbourn 
actually made statements to Detective Sanders, referring to how he felt 
when he arrived at the hospital. R264:26. The jury would not have naturally 
construed the references to what Fairbourn did not tell Detective Sanders as 
a comment on Fairbourn's exercise of _his right to remain silent. That is 
particularly true where, as here, the prosecutor did not exploit any "silence" 
by extensive argument. R264:102, 106. In fact, the bulk of the prosecutor's 
comment in closing argument permissibly referred to Fairbourn' s failure to 
tell his side of the story before receiving Miranda warnings. The prosecutor 
said, "everything that the defendant told you today, he had the chance to 
12 Fairbourn does not argue that what he said to Detective Sanders is 
the kind of statement that should be treated as silence under McCallie. 
McCallie-which issued about a month and a half before Fairbourn filed his 
opening brief-held that using statements about a defendant's involvement 
in an alleged crime does not violate Doyle, but using "statements about the 
suspect's involvement in the interrogation itself'' does violate Doyle because 
such statements are "the equivalent of silence." 2016 UT App 4, ifif20-21. 
Fairbourn does not cite McCallie and this Court should therefore not address 
it. See Allen v. Friel, 2008 UT 56, if 8, 194 P.3d 903. Regardless, reliance on 
McCallie would be misplaced in this case given the state of the record. Aside 
from one comment that fits into neither category identified by McCallie-
Fairbourn' s statement that he "thought he was dead and he felt that he was 
in hell," R264:26-we simply do not know what Fairbourn said to Detective 
Sanders, though we do know that he talked extensively for seven minutes, 
R264:133. The Court cannot assess whether there was a McCallie violation on 
this record. Cf Harrison, 805 P.2d at 788 & n.36 (noting record deficient to 
determine whether defendant exercised right to silence for Doyle purposes, 
and construing deficiency against defendant). 
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say before. When he was talking to Officer fife at the scene, he had an 
interview with Officer Sanders after-" R264:102. R264:15,17,19. Any 
. reference to pre-Miranda-warning silence is permissible. Fletcher, 455 U.S. at 
607; Jenkins, 447 _U.S. at 239-40. Thus, the statement that" everything that the 
defendant told you today, he had the chance to say before" was permissible 
insofar as it referred to Officer Fife. R264:102. And a lay jury would not have 
naturally and necessarily construed the brief, incomplete reference to 
Detective Sanders as referring to Fairbourn' s exercise of his Miranda rights. 
Thus, Fairbourn has not proven Doyle error. And in light of the 
foregoing precedents, any error that Fairbourn could prove would not have 
been obvious to the trial court. See State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, if 16, 95 P.3d 
276 (stating that to prove obvious error, appellant must show that "law 
governing the error was clear at the time the alleged error was made"). 
B. Because the officer's thoughts just before and when 
he shot Fairbourn supported the credibility and 
plausibility of his account, the prosecutor properly 
elicited and argued the officer's testimony about 
them. 
Fairbourn contends that "the prosecutor unfairly appealed to the 
jury's sympathies, passions, and prejudice" by asking Officer Vincent what 
was going through his mind during the attack, and by commenting on 
Officer Vincent's "emotional" state during his closing argument. Aplt. Br. at 
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24--25 (underlining omitted). Fairbourn embeds an evidentiary objection in 
his prosecutorial misconduct claim: He argues that Officer· Vincent's 
testimony about his "fear of dying and his family, how they depended on 
him, and his need to get home to them" was irrelevant as well as 
inadmissible under rule 403. Aplt. Br. at 24-25. 
Fairbourn cannot show plain error. Prosecutors have considerable 
latitude when arguing to the jury and are allowed to ask about a victim's 
thoughts to support a victim's credibility as a witness or the plausibility of 
his story. Even if the prosecutor's statements were improper, any error 
would not have been obvious to the trial court in light of caselaw allowing 
argument about a victim-witness's state of mind. And Fairbourn' s forfeited 
evidentiary arguments cannot support a prosecutorial-misconduct claim. 
1. Background Facts 
When Officer Vincent testified at trial that he saw Fairbourn wielding 
a knife and pointing it at him in a threatening manner, the prosecutor asked 
whether Officer Vincent's "thought process" about the situation had 
changed from when he was watching Fairbourn in the parking lot. 
R263:107. Officer Vincent acknowledged that it had. The prosecutor then 
asked, "What's personally going through your mind right now?" R263:107. 
Officer Vincent responded, in part, "My thoughts immediately shift 
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towards my family. I've got people that depend on me .... Like it's just pure 
?urvival at that point. ... [F]or me, it's just a matter of making it home at the 
end of the night at that point." R263:108. 
In his closing argument, the prosecutor argued that the situation had 
"upset" Officer Vincent and had "caused him pause" and a "significant 
amount of concerns." R264:96-97. The prosecutor referred to Officer Fife's 
testimony that he "could hear the stress in Officer Vincent's voice" when he 
responded to Officer Vincent's call for backup. R264:97. The prosecutor then 
contrasted Officer Vincent's agitated state with Officer Fife's testimony that 
Officer Vincent was typically "a pretty calm, collected guy," "a pretty cool 
cucumber, for lack· of a better word." R264:97. The prosecutor added that 
after Officer Vincent shot Fairbourn, Officer Vincent's thoughts changed 
"from a feeling of I'm going to die to what am I going to do to save this 
person." R264:98. 
In rebuttal, however, the prosecutor quoted from the jury instructions 
to remind the jury not to "'let any bias, sympathy or prejudice that you may 
feel towards one side or the other influence your decision in any way."' 
R264:1.27. The prosecutor emphasized to the jury that "however bad you may 
feel for Officer Vincent or the defendant in this case~ set those feelings aside 
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and decide this case on the facts, not on those feelings." R264:127 ( emphasis 
added). 
2. The prosecutor's questions and comments were proper, 
regardless of this Court's ultimate determination about 
the admissibility of the evidence. 
Fajrbourn argues that the prosecutor's brief questions and argument 
about Officer Vincent's state of mind were improper because they appealed 
to the jurors' sympathies, the testimony was irrelevant, and the testimony 
was inadmissible under rule 403. Aplt. Br. at 24-33. 
The prosecutor did not appeal to the jurors' sympathies, passions, or 
prejudices. And Fairbourn' s evidentiary objections cannot be a basis for a 
prosecu torial-misconduct claim. 
a. The testimony and argument about the police officer's 
state of mind did not appeal to the jurors' sympathies 
because it was used to establish the credibility and 
plausibility of the officer's testimony. 
The prosecutor's questions and argument regarding Officer Vincent's 
state of mind were proper. A "prosecutor exceeds the bounds of propriety 
by unfairly appealing to the sympathies, passions, and prejudices of the 
jury." State v. Isom, 2015 UT App 160~ ,I27, 354 P.3d 791 (brackets and 
internal quotation marks omitted). But it is not prosecutorial misconduct to 
encourage jurors to consider the thoughts of a victim-witness for the 
purpose of establishing the credibility and plausibility of wih1ess testiinony 
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as long as the questions address the victim "primarily as a witness," and are 
not "designed to appeal to passion or prejudice." Id. if if 30-31; see also 
Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, if if59-61. 
For example, in State v. Bakalov, the supreme court held that it was 
appropriate for the prosecutor to refer to testimony and reasonable 
inferences about the emotional trauma a rape victim suffered and to "invite 
the jury to consider this 'price' in assessing [the victim-witness's] 
credibility." 1999 UT 45, if 59. The court also rejected the argument that the 
prosecutor had improperly attempted to "emotionally rouse the jurors" by 
asking them to "consider how they would have responded" to the situation 
that the victim-witness faced. Id. 'if 61. 
Similarly, in State v. Isom, this Court held that it was not improper-
let alone obviously so- for the prosecutor to "ask[] the jurors 'to put 
themselves in the victim's place' and 'to empathize with the [victim-
witness's] alleged experience."' 2015 UT App 160, ilif24,31-32. The 
prosecutor had urged the jury to put itself in the "little shoes" of the child-
abuse victim "and think of how you would describe the offenses that 
occurred to you, how you would be able to help others understand what 
you experienced." Id. ,I26. He further urged the jury, "Try to figure out 
whether or not [the child] was intentionally h·ying to lie to you, really, about 
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anything of significance." Id. This Court held that the argument was proper 
because it simply invited the jurors to . "assess the child's credibility as a 
witness." Id. if 31. Accordingly, "the invi_tation [was] not an improper appeal 
to the jury to base its decision on sympathy for the victim but rather a 
means of asking the jury to reconstruct the situation in order to decide 
whether a witness'[s] testimony is plausible." Id. (alterations in original) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
Here, the prosecutor's questions and argument were qualitatively no 
different than the statements condoned in Bakalov and Isom. The questions 
to Officer Vincent appear to have been designed to help the jury assess 
Officer Vincent's credibility as a witness and the plausibility of his story. 
The State needed to prove that Fairbourn attempted to kill Officer Vincent 
and that he did so intentionally or with awareness that his actions were 
reasonably certain to cause that result. See Utah Code Ann. §76-5-202(1). 
Officer Vincent's testimony about Fairbourn' s explicit threat and 
movements supported that element. And the plausibility of that testimony 
was reinforced by Officer Vincent's testimony about his emotional reaction 
to Fairbourn' s explicit threat and movements-it was a logical response to 
Fairbourn's threatening words and actions. 
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Fairbourn argues that this brief testimony would have caused the jury 
to feel sympathetic to Officer Vincent and his family and vengeful to 
Fairbourn because Fairbourn "almost" deprived Officer Vincent's family of 
"their husband, father, and financial support." Aplt. Br. at 29. But even if the 
prosecutor's questions and comments had a slight tendency to invoke the 
jurors' sympathies, passions, and prejudices, the prosecutor did not 
"unfairly" appeal to such emotions. See Isom, 2015 UT App 160, if27. The 
prosecutor's questions and argument were brief, and the prosecutor used 
the questions and his argument about Officer Vincent's state of mind to 
establish Offic~r Vincent's credibility before the jury and provide a 
satisfactory explanation of why he shot Fairbourn-not to emotionally 
rouse the jury. In fact, the prosecutor explicitly urged the jury not to decide 
the case based on sympathy, "however bad you may feel for Officer 
Vincent." R264:127. 
Thus, the prosecutor did not appeal to the jurors' sympathies, 
passions, or prejudices in favor of Officer Vincent or his fa1nily. Rather, the 
prosecutor merely painted a picture of events for the jury in an effort to 
"reconsh·uct the situation" in a way that demonsh·ated that Officer 
Vincent's testimony was "plausible." Isom, 2015 UT App 160, if31 (internal 
quotation marks 01nitted). And in closing argument, the prosecutor did no 
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more than refer to the evidence in the case in a way that provided context 
for Officer Vincent's shooting of Fairbourn. Given the "considerable 
latitude" prosecutors are given in their arguments to the jury, that use was 
permissible. State v'. Valdez, 513 P.2d 422,426 (Utah 1973). 
Even if the prosecutor's questioning and argument was improper, it 
was not obviously so. In the case of prosecutorial misconduct, proving 
obvious error can be particularly difficult: "Because the line which separates 
acceptable from improper advocacy is often difficult to draw, obvious error 
exists only if the law was sufficiently clear or plainly settled and the 
prosecutor's comments were so obviously improper that the trial court had 
an opportunity to address the error.'' Isom, 2015 UT App 160, ,I29 (citations 
and internal quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, a prosecutor's 
questions or arguments that "[a]t first blush" may appear to "fall squarely" 
within an established prohibition are not necessarily obvious error when 
viewed in context. Id. iJ30. 
In light of the cases demonstrating that prosecutors may refer to a 
victim-witness's state of mind in closing argument, it would not have been 
obvious to the trial court that the questions and oblique references to Officer 
Vincent's state of mind was somehow different. 
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b. Prosecutorial misconduct may not be established by · 
relying on alleged violations of the Rules of Evidence 
that were not raised at trial. 
Fairbourn attempts to shoehorn unpreserved evidentiary objections 
into his prosecutorial-misconduct argument. He claims that the prosecutor's 
questioning and comments are improper because the testimony about 
Officer Vincent's state of mind was irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial, in 
violation of rules 402 and 403, Utah Rules of Evidence. See Aplt. Br. at 25-31. 
The Rules of Evidence cannot establish prosecutorial misconduct. 
Prosecutorial misconduct exists only where a prosecutor argues matters not 
in evidence or otherwise brings to the jury's attention matters it cannot 
consider in making its decision. State v. Todd, 2007 UT App 349, if 22, 173 
P.3d 170. But until a court concludes that evidence must be excluded, a jury 
may consider it. By necessary extension, a prosecutor may present and 
argue evidence that the trial court has not excluded because the jury may 
consider it. Thus, because Fairboum did not object to the state-of-mind 
testimony on relevance or unfair-prejudice grounds, the testimony was 
admitted and was a fair object of argument. 
In effect, Fairbourn says that the prosecutor's due process duty 
extends to predicting what a court would exclude if only the defendant 
objected to it. He cites no support for this remarkable contention. Rather, it 
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is for the court to decide what evidence the law allows the jury to hear. And 
if the court has not excluded evidence, it is not ~nfair for the prosecutor to 
present and argue it. 
Further, the United States Sup!eme Court has cautic~med against 
expansive readings of the fundamental-fairness guarantee of the Due 
Process Clause: "Beyond the specific guarantees enumerated in the Bill of 
Rights, the Due Process Clause has limited operation. We, therefore, have 
defined the category of infractions that violate 'fundamental fairness' very 
narrowly." Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 352 (1990). For example, 
the Supreme Court has rejected a claim that the admission of evidence in 
violation of rule 404(b ), Federal Rules of Evidence, rendered a trial 
fundamentally unfair, see id. at 346-47, 352-54, and a claim that the 
admission of irrelevant evidence rendered a trial fundamentally unfair, see 
Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 70 (1991). The Utah Supreme Court has also 
cautioned that where procedura~ rules apply, the Due Process Clause 
should not be used as "a free-wheeling constitutional license for courts to 
assure fairness on a case-by-case basis." In re Discipline of Steffensen, 2016 UT 
18, 1,I 7-8. This Court should therefore hold that a claim of prosecutorial 
misconduct may not be established by relying on alleged violations of the 
Rules of Evidence. 
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Thus, even if the evidence were irrelevant or unfairly prejudicial, 
Fairbourn's prosecutorial-misconduct claim fails. 13 
C. The prosecutor did not ask Fairbourn to comment on 
other witnesses' veracity; rather, he properly asked 
Fairbourn to clarify discrepancies in the evidence. 
Fairbourn argues that the trial court committed obvious, prejudicial 
error by failing to intervene when the prosecutor allegedly asked Fairbourn 
"to comment on the veracity of other witnesses' testimony." Aplt. Br. at 33 
(underlining omitted). 
Fairbourn cannot show plain error. There was no impropriety 
because the prosecutor merely asked Fairbourn to explain discrepancies 
between his testimony and that of the other witnesses at trial and not to 
comment about whether other witnesses were lying. But even if the 
prosecutor's questions about the prior testimony were iinproper, that 
13 Even if this Court were to disregard Fairbourn's litigation strategy 
of forgoing any direct evidentiary challenge on appeal and address the 
merits of his evidentiary claims as independent bases for relief, it should 
conclude that Officer Vincent's state-of-mind testimony was relevant for the 
same reasons the questioning was proper: The testimony made Officer 
Vincent's account more plausible. See also infra Part II.D. (discussing 
relevance of the 21-foot-rule). And-for the same reasons the testimony did 
not unfairly appeal to the sympathies, passions, and prejudices of the jury-
it should conclude that Fairbourn has not overcome the presumption of 
admissibility under rule 403 to demonsh·ate that Officer Vincent's.testimony 
presented a danger of unfair prejudice that substantially outweighed its 
probative value. See, e.g., State v. McCullar, 2014 UT App 215, if if 46-49, 335 
P.3d 900 ( discussing requirements of rule 403). 
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impropriety would not have been obvious to the trial court because the 
question here was at least arguably like ·questions this Court has found to be 
permissible. 
1. Background Facts 
During cross-examination, the prosecutor asked Fairbourn whether 
he had heard the testimony of the eyewitnesses saying that they saw him 
lunge at Officer Vincent with a knife. R264:71-72. When Fairbourn 
acknowledged that he had, the prosecutor asked, "So if you were trying to 
submit or surrender to the officer and these witnesses are perceiving 
something else, is it your testimony today that this is just a 
misunderstanding on their part?" R264:72. Fairbourn responded by stating 
that there may be many reasons to explain the discrepancy: 
No. You know, when something happens and everyone has 
different perspectives or advantage points, you know, it's not 
always, you know, perceived as the other person perceives it. 
R264:72. Fairbourn then proceeded to reiterate his version of events, stating 
that he was simply holding the knife out to show Officer Vincent what was 
in his hands. R264:72. 
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2. The prosecutor did not ask Fairbourn to comment on 
other witnesses' credibility, and certainly did not plainly 
do so. 
It is not misconduct for a prosecutor to "clarify apparent 
discrepancies and general confusion" among witnesses. State v. Thompson, 
2014 UT App 14, ,I47, 318 P.3d 1221. While it is "improper to ask a criminal 
defendant to comment on the veracity of another witness," a prosecutor 
"may ask questions that seek to clarify defendant's testimony in relation to 
prior testimony of another witness." Id. if 48 (internal quotation marks 
omitted); see also State v. Enmzett, 839 P.2d 781, 787 (Utah 1992); Davis, 2013 
UT App 228, ,I~37-39. In Thompson, the prosecutor asked the defendant 0 S0, 
one of [the witness accounts] wasn't true. Which one was the truth? ... Why 
don't you tell us what happened .... You think [the other witness is] wrong 
about that?" 2014 UT App 14, if49. This Court held that the prosecutor's 
questions were appropriate, reasoning that "the prosecutor was not 
suggesting perjury or asking Thompson to comment on [another witness's] 
character or motivations. Rather, the prosecutor was highlighting a 
perceived discrepancy in the testimony and asking Thompson to clarify his 
testimony in relation to [the other witness's] testimony." Id. if 50. 
The prosecutor's phrasing in this case was even less akin to a request 
to comment on veracity than the permissible questions in Thompson. The 
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prosecutor here did not ask Fairbourn to identify which witness account 
"wasn't the truth." He merely questioned why the witness accounts 
differed, even suggesting that the evidence contradicting Fairbourn' s 
account was a mere misunderstanding, not untruthful. 14 Even more clearly 
here than in Thompson, the prosecutor merely asked "questions that seek to 
clarify defendant's testimony in relation to prior testimony of another 
witness." Id. if 48 (internal quotation marks omitted). He did not ask 
Fairbourn to accuse them of lying or otherwise comment on their character 
or motivations. 
And Fairbourn did neither in any event. He accepted the other 
witnesses' testimony as true from their perspective, plausibly explaining 
that different perspectives can yield different perceptions of the same 
events. R264:72. 
The questions were proper because they did not put Fairbourn in the 
position of having to accuse other witnesses of lying, and he did not do so. 
And because they were farther from the forbidden questions than those 
deemed proper in Thompson, they certainly did not plainly do so. 
14 While State v. Davis could be read to prohibit questioning a 
defendant about why his account differed from another witness, see 2013 UT 
App 228, if ,f37-39, this Court clarified in State v. Thompson that the focus is 
on whether the defendant is asked to accuse other witnesses of lying, see 
2014 UT App 14, ,I,r48,50. 
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D. Fairbourn cannot show prejudice on his misconduct 
claims. 
Fairbourn argues that the State bears the burden of disproving 
prejudice beyond a reasonable doubt. Aplt. Br. at 11. However, the supreme 
court recently clarified that the defendant bears the burden of proving 
prejudice on unpreserved claims of prosecutorial misconduct. Bond, 2015 
UT 88, iJif 41-46. 15 
Fairbourn argues that the prosecutor's questions and comments 
prejudiced him because (1) the trial court gave no curative instructions; (2) 
the alleged misconduct was pervasive; and (3) "this was a close case," and 
the alleged misconduct undermined Fairbourn' s credibility. Aplt. Br. at 22-
23, 36-41. Fairbourn argues that the prosecutor's questions and comments 
about the hospital interview were sufficiently prejudicial to warrant reversal 
without any other error. Aplt. Br. at 22-23. But he implicitly concedes that 
15 Generally, defendants bear the burden of proving prejudice even 
for preserved prosecutorial-misconduct claims. See, e.g., Kohl, 2000 UT 35, 
if 24. The State must prove that any misconduct was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt only when the misconduct interferes with an enumerated 
constitutional right, such as the right against self-incrimination. See Chapnzan 
v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 19, 24 (1967); State v. Maestas, 2012 UT 46, if162,, 299 
P.3d 892. Thus, if this Court concludes that Fairbourn preserved his Doyle 
claim, the State will bear the burden of proving that any Doyle error was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 
629-30 (1993); McCallie, 2016 UT App 4, if12. That standard does not, 
however, extend to Fairbourn' s remaining claims of prosecutorial 
misconduct. 
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the other two instances of alleged misconduct are not sufficiently prejudicial 
standing alone, because he argues prejudice only in the aggregate. See Aplt. 
Br. at 35-41. 
Even if the prosecutor's comments and questions were improper, any 
misconduct was harmless - both individually and in the aggregate. 
Cautionary Instructions. Although Fairbourn is correct that the court 
gave no cautionary instructions on the alleged Doyle error, cautionary 
instructions were given relevant to the other two instances of alleged 
misconduct. In eval~ating prejudice, the Court looks not just at whether 
curative instructions were given in the moment; rather, it looks to all 
relevant jury instructions. See Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1225. Otherwise, this factor 
would always favor a finding of prejudice when defense counsel fails to 
object and request a curative instruction. 
As to Officer Vincent's emotional reaction and concern for his family, 
the trial court instructed the jury not to let bias, sympathy, or prejudice 
affect the verdict. R176. And the prosecutor quoted that instruction in 
closing argument, further urging the jury to decide the case on the facts, 
"however bad you may feel for Officer Vincent." R264:127. Juries are 
presmned to follow cautionary instructions in the absence of proof to the 
contrary. State v. Moyer, 2014 UT App 7, il14, 318 P.3d 1182. The time the 
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jury took to deliberate suggests that the jury did follow that instruction-
that it based its decision on a careful consideration of the evidence, not 
sympathy for one side or the other. 
Similarly, the trial court's instructions - and Fairbourn' s response to 
the prosecutor's question-cured any harm that could have come from the 
prosecutor asking Fairboum whether a discrepancy in the testimony was 
the result of a misunderstanding on the part of the other witnesses. The trial 
court instructed the jury, "Honest people may remember the same event 
differently." R183. Fairbourn's sophisticated response to the prosecutor's 
question mirrored that instruction. He explained that the other witnesses 
perceived the incident from different perspectives, and this, rather than 
untruthfulness, accounted for the differences in their testimonies and his. 
R264:72. Fairbourn then took the opportunity to reiterate his version of 
events for the jury. R264:72. This Court has held that when a prosecutor 
asks the defendant to comment on another witness's veracity but the 
defendant's answer "alert[ s] the jury that there could be conflicts in 
testimony based on reasons other than that one party was lying," there is no 
prejudice from the improper question. State v Stevenson, 884 P.2d 1287, 1291 
(Utah Ct. App. 1994). That is exactly what happened here. 
-47-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Isolated Error. The alleg~d impropriety was not pervasive. In fact, it 
was relatively isolated. The few questions about the hospital interview fall 
short of the type of sustained questioning and argument that epitomizes 
exploitation of a defendant's silence. Cf State v. Wiswell, 639 P.2d 146, 146-
47 (Utah 1981) (involving repeated attempts to question witness and argue 
about silence despite sustained objections and an admonition from the trial 
court). And the prosecutor referred to it only briefly in closing argument. As 
explained above, supra Part I.A.3., most of the prosecutor's isolated 
comment in closing argument permissibly referred to Fairbourn' s failure to 
tell his story to Officer Fife before receiving Miranda warnings. The direct 
reference to Detective Sanders in _ closing argument was fleeting, 
interrupted, and incomplete. R264:102. 
The two questions and Officer Vincent's answers about his state of 
mind were also brief, not even filling o~e page of a 300-page trial transcript. 
R263:107-08. The prosecutor's argument on this evidence was similarly 
brief, filling less than one transcript page. R264:96-97, 98. Furthermore, the 
argument referred only obliquely to the testimony to which Fairbourn now 
objects, referring generally to Officer Vincent's emotional state and his 
thought that he was going to die. R264:96-98. It was not the focus of the 
prosecutor's case. And as explained, it was not likely to lead to conviction 
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on an improper basis. It was geared to explaining why Officer Vincent's 
account was plausible, not to make the jury convict Fairbourn because it felt 
sorry for Officer Vincent or his family. 
The prosecutor's question about whether other witnesses 
misunderstood what they saw was also isolated, involving a single 
question. R264:72. The prosecutor never referred to it in closing argument, 
let alone suggested that Fairbourn had accused the other witnesses of lying, 
which of course he had not. 
Even taking all the alleged instances together, each brief set of 
questions or references in closing argument did not become the focus of the 
prosecutor's case and likely did not stand out in the jurors' minds or 
otherwise influence the verdict. See State v. Clark, 2014 UT App 56, if34, 322 
P.3d 761 (concluding misconduct was harmless because, in part, it "was not 
the focus of the prosecutor's argument"). 
Strength of the Evidence. This was not a close case. The evidence of 
Fairbourn' s guilt was sh~ong. Generally, evidence of intent is necessarily 
limited to circumstantial evidenc~. See Salt Lake City v. Carrera, 2015 UT 73, 
,Ill, 358 P.3d 1067. But here, the State presented direct evidence of 
Fairbourn' s intent to kill Officer Vincent: Officer Vincent testified that when 
he got out of his car, Fairbourn, knife in hand, said, "[You're] about to 
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fucking die." R263:105-06. See State v. Morrison, 937 P.2d 1293, 1297 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1997) (imply_ing that Doyle error is more likely to be harmless when 
case involves direct evidence). Fairbourn, of course, denied saying this and 
claimed he was not acting in a threatening manner. R264:61-64,66. This may 
have been the close case that Fairbourn claims it was if the case came down 
to a credibility contest between Fairbourn and Officer Vincent. See State v. 
Byrd, 937 P.2d 532, 536 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) · (concluding Doyle error was 
prejudicial where case involved credibility contest). 
But it did not. Four of the five eyewitnesses corroborated Officer 
:'Jincent's testimony. And while each of those eyewitness's testimony varied 
somewhat because of their different vantage points, all four saw Fairbourn 
mov~g in a manner consistent with Officer Vincent's testimony that in the 
final moments before the shooting, Fairbourn raised his arm, switched his 
knife to a reverse grip, and advanced on Officer Vincent. R263:24,35-37,39-
41,63-66,68,78-80, 109,114-15. VVhile Fairbourn's actions provide only 
circumstantial evidence of his intent to kill Officer Vincent, the 
circumstantial nature of the evidence "does not diminish the probative force 
of the evidence," State v. Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, 147 n.1, 326 P.3d 645 (internal 
quotation marks omitted)-particularly when that circumstantial evidence 
is corroborated by so many eyewitnesses, see Morrison, 937 P.2d at 1297 
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(implying that Doyle error is more likely to be harmless when otherwise 
conflicting evidence is corroborated). 16 
Defense Counsel's Response. Although Fairbourn does not address 
the issue, the supreme court has held that potential prejudice from a 
prosecutor's improper statements must be analyzed in the context of how 
defense counsel responded at trial. Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, if56; Dunn, 850 P.2d 
at 1225. Although defense counsel did not respond to the brief references to 
Officer Vincent's state of mind or to the prosecutor's question about 
16 This Court has stated that the prejudice analysis for Doyle error 
considers '"whether there was overwhehning evidence of defendant's 
guilt."' McCallie, 2016 UT App 4, if28 (quoting Byrd, 937 P.2d at 535); see also 
Morrison, 937 P.2d at 1296; State v. Reyes, 861 P.2d 1055, 1057 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993). But that rule is inconsistent with supreme court precedent. Although 
it is true that overwhelming evidence of guilt will render an error harmless, 
the supreme court has never adopted a rule that evidence of guilt must be 
overwhelming to demonstrate harmless error. Instead, the supreme court 
looks to the strength and nature of the evidence as one factor among many, 
even in cases involving a prosecutor's comment on a defendant's failure to 
testify at trial. See, e.g., Maestas, 2012 UT 46, if if162, 165 (concluding that 
error was harmless because, in part, evidence was overwhelming); Tillman, 
750 P.2d at 555 (same); Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1224-25 (concluding that 
prosecutor's improper comments were harmless even in the face of 
somewhat weak evidence); Emmett, 839 P.2d at 786 (concluding that 
prosecutor's improper cormnent was prejudicial because evidence was "not 
strong"); State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483, 486-87 (Utah 1984) (same). This Court 
has repeatedly done the same, focusing on "the strength of the evidence 
supporting a defendant's guilt and the strength of the conflicting evidence." 
State v. Campos, 2013 UT App 213, if 67, 309 P.3d 1160; accord, e.g., State v. 
Saenz, 2016 UT App 69, iris n.4, 370 P.3d 1278; Thompson, 2014 UT App 14, 
if83; Todd, 2007 UT App 349, if 33. 
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discrepancies in the evidence, he did respond to the questions and comment 
abo~t Fairbourn's hospital interview. Defense counsel elicited testimony 
about Fairbourn's condition during the hospital interview and responded at 
length in closing argument to the prosecutor's brief, incomplete reference to 
the interview. He referred to Fairbourn' s physical and mental condition 
following a major surgery. R264:116-17. He reiterated that Fairbourn 
"doesn't have any obligation to come forward" with evidence and argued 
that the jury could not infer guilt from Fairbourn' s failure to come forward 
with an exculpatory story before trial. R264:117. He emphasized that 
Detective Sanders never asked Fairbourn any questions that would have 
elicited an exculpatory story. R264:117. Defense counsel ended his extended 
response to the prosecutor's brief reference with an admonition to the jury 
that the trial was Fairbourn's opportunity to tell an exculpatory story. 
R264:117-18. 
In light of defense counsel's response in closing argument; the strong, 
corroborated evidence of Fairbourn' s guilt; the relatively isolated nature of 
the prosecutor's questions and comments and the small role they played in 
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the prosecution's case; and the trial court's cautionary insh·uctions, any 
error was harmless. 17 
II. 
Officer Vincent's testimony about his training that an 
armed person within 21 feet of an officer can strike 
him before the officer can draw his gun explained the 
officer's reason for shooting Fairbourn. The scientific 
accuracy of the rule was not material, and the trial 
court did not plainly err by allowing the testimony 
without expert testimony on the 21-foot rule's 
scientific validity. 
Fairbourn contends that evidence about "the 21-foot rule" is 
"inadmissible expert testimony." Aplt. Br. at 42-43. He also contends that 
Officer Vincent's testimony about the 21-foot rule is irrelevant. Aplt. Br. at 
44-45. 
Fairbourn waived his expert-testimony objection at trial and cannot 
now assert it on appeal. But even if he could, his argument fails because the 
testimony was limited to what Officer Vincent was told to show why he felt 
he needed to shoot Fairbourn. It was not offered to prove that Fairbourn 
was a threat to Vincent. Its scientific validity was therefore not at issue. 
A. Background Facts 
At h·ial, each eyewitness, including Fairbourn and Officer Vincent, 
testified about how far apart Officer Vincent and Fairbourn were. The 
17 Although the heightened standard does not apply to unpreserved 
Doyle claims, any Doyle error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
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estimates varied. The largest estimate of the final distance was Fairbourn' s 
testimony that, before he took two steps toward Officer Vincent and was 
shot, he was 20 to 25 feet away. R264:71. The smallest estimates placed the 
two as close as 5 feet away when Fairbourn was shot. R263:23,50; see also 
R263:33-35,39,41 (describing the two as 15 feet apart when they were 
squared off, before Fairbourn switched the knife to a reverse grip, but 
noting that the two "became closer and closer," ending up 8 to 10 feet 
apart); R263:65,68-69 (describing the two as about 10 feet apart when 
Fairbourn was shot); R263:80-83 ( describing the two as 8 to 10 feet apart 
when Fairbourn, was shot); R263:131 (Officer Vincent testifying that 
Fairbourn was 15 to 16 feet away when he shot him). 
During Office Vincent's testimony, the prosecutor asked whether 
there was "anything about the distance between you and the defendant that 
caused you concern at this point?" R263:111. Defense counsel objected when 
Officer Vincent began to refer to a rule he was taught in training. R263:111. 
The trial court sustained the objection but later reversed its ruling and, after 
further argument, allowed the testimony. R263:113,121-30. The prosecutor 
repeated his question, and Officer Vincent responded, "When I went 
through ... peace officer's standards and training, they instructed me that 
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~ 
~ 
anything within 21 feet is a kill zone. Before someone could get a shot off, 
they could actually get stabbed within that distance." R263:132. 
B. Fairbourn waived any objection that the testimony 
was improper expert testimony from a lay witness. 
Utah courts have long held that a defendant may not seek to 
challenge his conviction or sentence based on "error which was 
affirmatively, knowingly, and intentionally waived" below. Parsons, 781 
P.2d at 1285. "To rule otherwise would permit a defendant in a criminal 
case to 'invite' prejudicial error and implant it in the record as a form of 
appellate insurance against an adverse sentence." Id.; see also State v. Moa, 
2012 UT 28, ~ ~25-26, 282 P.3d 985 (" [T]he object of the invited error 
doctrine is to discourage parties from leading the court into committing an 
error and then benefitting from an objection to that error on appeal .... "); 
State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ,Ill, 10 P.3d 346 ("[A] defendant should not be 
permitted to forego making an objection with the strategy of 'enhanc[ing] 
the defendant's chances of acquittal and then, if that sh·ategy fails, ... 
claim[ing] on appeal that the Court should reverse."' ( omission and second 
and third alterations in original). 18 Even when a party initially objects, he 
waives that objection for purposes of appeal by consenting at trial to a 
18 This issue may be viewed appropriately either in terms of waiver or 
invited error. 
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proposed resolution of that objection. Walker v. Hansen, 2003 UT App 237, 
~17, 74 P.3d 635. In Walker, for example, the plaintiff objected to the 
wording of a jury instruction but agreed to a reworded instruction to 
resolve the plaintiff's concerns. Id. This Court held that Walker had waived 
any objection to the modified instruction by agreeing to it. Id. 
Fairbourn likewise waived his expert-witness objection. When the 
prosecutor initially asked Officer Vincent whether there was anything about 
the distance that concerned him, defense counsel objected as soon as Officer 
Vincent began to talk about his tr_aining. R263:111. Defense counsel argued 
that Officer Vincent's state of mind was not relevant to the case. R263:111-
13. As the parties argued the issue of relevance, defense counsel added an 
objection on the basis that expert testimony was required. R263:127-29. 
Outside_ the presence of the jury, the prosecutor proffered what Officer 
Vincent's testimony would be, with Officer Vincent adding that "they've 
done studies" to develop the 21-foot rule. R263:126. Defense counsel 
reiterated his relevance objection but argued that, if the testimony was to be 
admitted over his relevance objection, it should be limited to what Officer 
Vincent was taught and not refer to any studies; otherwise, Fairbourn 
would need to call his "own expert." R263:126-27. The prosecutor and 
Officer Vincent agreed to that limitation. R263:127-28. With that agreement 
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m place, defense counsel stated, "That would take care of my other 
objections .... " R263:128. 
The testimony was ultimately elicited and admitted consistent with 
Fairbourn's proposed limitation that Officer Vincent testify only to what he 
was taught and not to its scientific validity. R263:131-32. 
Fairbourn thus waived his expert-witness objection by proposing-
not just agreeing to- a limitation on the testimony. Fairbourn' s proposed 
limitation would, of course, not operate as a waiver of his relevance 
objection. But Fairbourn explicitly agreed that his proposed limitation 
would II take care of my other objections" - his only other objection being an 
expert-testimony objection. R263:128. Fairbourn now argues that even the 
limited testimony would have required an expert. But that limitation was 
initiated by Fairbourn. See State v. McNeil, 2016 UT 3, ,r,r17-23, 365 P.3d 699 
(limiting invited error to error that was initiated by the defendant). 
Fairbourn thus II encourage[ed] the court to proceed without further 
consideration of [the] issue." Moa, 2012 UT 28, if 27. Allowing Fairbourn to 
propose a limitation on the testimony to resolve an objection and then use 
that same objection to obtain relief on appeal- even when the testimony 
was limited as agreed-would present a classic case of planting error. See id. 
,I25; Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ,Ill; Parsons, 781 P.2d at 1285. 
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In discussing its ruling, the trial court made statements suggesting 
that the testimony was admissible to show that Fairbourn was a threat. 
R263:128-30. 19 But the trial court's rationale for its ruling is irrelevant to the 
question o! whether Fairbourn waived his objection- or whether the 
ultimate ruling was correct. The trial court's statements were made outside 
the presence of the jury, and all that was presented to the jury was Officer 
Vincent's circumscribed testimony as to what he was taught-the very thing 
Fairbourn suggested and agreed would be acceptable. R263:132. Defense 
counsel's final statement on the matter-that use of the 21-foot rule to show 
that a person _"constitutes a threat if you are within 21 feet ... [is] in the 
nature of expert testimony" -at most presents an objection to improper use 
of the testimony. R263:129. But the testimony was never used in that way. 
The prosecutor did not even refer to the 21-foot rule in his closing 
argument. R264:94-110,127-30. In short, the testimony was admitted just as 
Fairbourn agreed it could be, and he cannot now claim that his proposed 
limitation was insufficient. The only issue he preserved for appeal is 
whether the 21-foot rule was relevant. 
19 Given other contradictory statements the trial court made, 
R263:121-30, it may well have meant that it was admitting the testimony to 
establish whether Officer Vincent believed Fairbourn posed a threat. 
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C. Even if Fairbourn did not waive his objection, an 
expert is not needed to establish whether a police 
officer was instructed on the 21-foot rule. 
Regardless, expert testimony was not required because the issue was 
how what Officer Vincent was taught affected h_is decision to shoot 
Fairbourn. That testimony is lay fact testimony, not expert testimony. Lay 
fact testimony "need not satisfy rule 701 or 702," Utah Rules of Evidence, 
which govern lay opinion testimony and expert testimony, respectively. 
State v. Rothlisberger, 2006 UT 49, ,I16, 147 P.3d 1176. Lay testimony is any 
testimony that is "not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized 
know ledge." Id. 111. 
Fairbourn argues that Officer Vincent's testimony was expert 
testimony rather than lay testimony because it was based on specialized 
knowledge, as evidenced by the fact that Officer Vincent learned about the 
21-foot rule "through the extensive training he received as a police officer." 
Aplt. Br. at 43. Fairbourn thus argues that the testimony was inadmissible 
because the State failed to lay the appropriate foundation for expert 
testitnony. Aplt. Br. at 43. Fairbourn is incorrect. 
Specialized knowledge is "knowledge with which lay persons are not 
fa1niliar," that is "beyond the ken of the average juror," or that is "outside 
the knowledge of a civilian bystander." Rothlisberger, 2006 UT 49, ,131 
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(internal quotation marks omitted). In contrast, testimony is not based on 
specialized knowledge if "an average bystander would be able to provide 
the same testimony" or would understand the importance of the fact if they 
observed it. Id. if if 33-34. If an average juror observed what the witness observed 
and could attest to the same facts without "extensive training and years of 
experience," then the testimony involves lay fact testimony. Id. if 36. 
Testimony about the accuracy of the 21-foot rule-about the precise 
distance at which a knife-wielding assailant becomes a threat-would be 
beyond the ken of the average juror. But Officer Vincent testified only that 
he was taught the 21-foot rule and that that was why he was concerned 
about the distance between him and Fairbourn. R263:131-32. If an average 
bystander sat in on Officer Vincent's training, she could have testified to the 
fact that Officer Vincent was told to be wary of knife-wielding assailants 
who come within 21 feet. No "extensive training" or "years of experience" 
would be needed to attest to that fact or to understand its likely impact on 
Officer Vincent's perception of the threat Fairbourn posed. See Rothlisberger, 
2006 UT 49, if ~33, 36. The testimony was thus lay fact testimony and no 
expert was required. 
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D. The police officer's state of mind was relevant to 
providing context for the State's case. 
Fairbourn argues that the 21-foot rule is relevant only to whether a 
victim "has a reasonable fear of imminent bodily harm." Aplt. Br. at 44. That 
issue, he argues, arises in self-defense or excessive force cases, but it was not 
relevant to the issues in this case. Aplt. Br. at 44-45. He also argues more 
generally that a victim's state of mind is irrelevant because it is not an 
element of attempted aggravated murder. Aplt. Br. at 26-27. 
But the fact that Officer Vincent was taught the 21-foot rule was 
relevant here to explain why he shot Fairbourn. And explaining why he 
shot Fairbourn is relevant to the circumstances surrounding the offense and 
provided critical context for the State's case. 
Evidence is relevant where it "has any tendency to make a fact more 
or less probable than it would be without the evidence" and where "the fact 
is of consequence in determining the action." Utah R. Evid. 401. "[E]vidence 
that has even the slightest probative value is relevant under the rules of 
evidence." State v. Reece, 2015 UT 45, if 64, 349 P.3d 712 (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
The prosecution has ~ "right to present evidence with broad 
'narrative value' beyond the establishment of particular elements of a 
crime," so long as it is "plausibly linked" to the charged conduct. State v. 
-61-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Verde, 2012 UT 60, ,r,r28, 29, 296 P.3d 673. "[T]he prosecutor is entitled to 
paint a factual picture of the context in which the events in question 
transpired," State v. Morgan, 813 P.2d 1207, 1210 n.4 (Utah Ct. App. 1991 ), 
"not just to prove a fact but to establish its human significance," Old Chief v. 
United States, 519 U.S. 172, 187 (1997). Under "basic principles of narrative 
relevance," evidence beyond the specific criminal thoughts and actions of 
the defendant may be admissible to prove context for the events that led to 
the criminal charges. State v. McCullar, 2014 UT App 215, if 57, 335 P.3d 900 
(internal quotation marks omitted). That is true even if the evidence 
involves a victim's state of mind. See State v. Bates, 784 P.2d 1126, 1127-28 
(Utah 1989) (concluding that evidence of victim's state of mind was relevant 
to show why she did not report crime earlier). 
Flexibility to provide evidence with broad narrative value is 
necessary. If the State were prohibited from adducing any fact that did not 
provide direct proof of an element of the charged offense, the State would 
be unable to tell a coherent, credible story to the jury. "U]uries have 
expectations as to what evidence ought to be presented by a party, and may 
well hold the absence of that evidence against the party." Old Chief, 519 U.S. 
at 188 n.9. 
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Evidence that Officer Vincent was taught the 21-foot rule had 
immense narrative value for the State's case, as it provided an explanation 
why he shot Fairbourn three times. See Verde, 2012 UT 60, ,128. Any time a 
police officer shoots a defendant, the State must be allowed to present 
evidence explaining why the officer did so, even when that officer is not on 
trial. Otherwise, the jury could become unfairly prejudiced against the State, 
and the omission would undermine the plausibility of the State's case. 
Without such an explanation, the jury may have wondered whether Officer 
Vincent acted too rashly. And even though that would not have been a 
defense for Fairbourn, it may have raised concerns that the State was 
properly allowed to address. Such holes in the basic narrative of an ev_ent 
would be exploited by defense counsel, who would argue to the jury that 
the State's story does not make sense and is thus incredible. Therefore, even 
if Officer Vincent's thoughts are not directly related to Fairbourn' s actions 
and intent, they are still highly relevant because without them there would 
be a "missing chapter[] in the prosecution's case." Id. (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
Elsewhere m his brief, Fairbourn cites State v. Wauneka and its 
progeny for the proposition that a victim's state of mind is not relevant 
absent something that puts it at issue in the case. Aplt. Br. at 33; see State v. 
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Wauneka, 560 P.2d 1377 (Utah 1977). But Wauneka is inapposite. Wauneka 
held that evidence of a homicide victim's state of mind is irrelevant except 
when the victim's mental state is at issue at trial, such as when the 
defendant contests identify or raises claims of self-defense, suicide, or 
accident to which the victim contributed as an aggressor. 560 P.2d at 1380. 
But Officer Vincent was not a homicide victim. He testified at trial. As 
,. 
discussed above, a victim's state of mind may be relevant to establishing the 
credibility of that victim as a testifijing witness. See, e.g., Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, 
,r,r59-61. 
Even if Wauneka applied, that case recognized another exception: 
evidence of a victim's state of mind is admissible when "relevant to prove 
or explain her subsequent acts or conduct." 560 P.2d at 1379. For example, 
in State v. Garrido, this Court concluded that a statement about a victim's 
fear of the defendant was properly admitted to explain why the victim 
failed to appear at trial-which clearly was not an element of the charged 
offense. 2013 UT App 245, if 25, 314 P.3d 1014. The statement was also 
admissible to explain an inconsistency between two of the victim's prior 
statements that were admitted, because the victiln' s "credibility had become 
an issue at trial." Id. 
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Such is the case here. Officer Vincent's testimony that he was taught 
the 21-foot rule was "relevant to prove or explain [his] subsequent acts or 
conduct" - his shooting of Fairbourn. See Wauneka, 560 P.2d at 1379; Garrido 
2013 UT App 245, ,I25. In other words, testimony about the 21-foot rule 
provided evidence of the circumstances and context surrounding the crime 
and the broader narrative of the event, which was relevant because that 
evidence made the State's case more believable. Thus, the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion when it ruled that the evidence was relevant. 
E. Fairbourn was not prejudiced by the prosecutor's brief 
reference to the 21-f oot rule, even when viewed 
cumulatively with the other alleged errors. 
Fairbourn implicitly concedes that admission of testimony about the 
21-foot rule is not prejudicial on its own. He argues prejudice only in the 
context of cumulative error. Aplt. Br. at 45-47. Fairbourn argues that the 
cumulative effect of the alleged errors prejudiced him because "this was a 
close case based on relatively thin evidence in which the jury struggled to 
reach a verdict." Aplt. Br. at 45-47. 
To prevail under the cumulative error doch·ine, Fairbourn must show 
that he was prejudiced by "the cumulative effect of the several errors." 
Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1229. He cannot do so here. Because there was no 
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prosecutorial misconduct and no evidentiary error, Fairbourn cannot 
prevail under the cumulative error doctrine. 
But even if this Court finds error on each point alleged by Fairbourn, 
the cumulative effect of those errors would have been minimal. As 
discussed above, the aggregate effect of each instance of alleged 
prosecutorial misconduct was harmless. Adding in the reference to the 21-
foot rule does not change that calculus. Although the parties argued about 
the rule extensively outside the presence of the jury, R263:113,121-30, the 
jury heard only a brief, two-sentence reference to the rule, R263:131-32. 
Significantly, neither side referred to the 21-foot rule in closing argument. 
R264:94-130. In light of the strong direct and circumstantial evidence that 
Fairbourn intentionally attempted to kill Officer Vincent, corroborated by 
four eyewitnesses, see supra Part I.D., any errors were harmless, even when 
viewed in the aggregate. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm. 
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Addendum A 
Utah Rules of Evidence 401,402, and 403 
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Rule 401. Definition Of "Relevant Evidence" 
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any 
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less 
probable than it would be without the evidence. 
Rule 402. Relevant Evidence Generally Admissible; Irrelevant Evidence Inadmissible 
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of 
the United States or the Constitution of the state of Utah, statute, or by these rules, or by 
other rules applicable in courts of this state. Evidence which is not relevant is not ad-
missible. 
Rule 403. Exclusion Of Relevant Evidence On Grounds Of Prejudice, Confusion, Or 
Waste Of Time 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the 
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative 
evidence. 
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
OSTON SHILOH FAIRBOURN, 
Defendant. 
Custody: Salt Lake County Jail 
PRESENT 
Clerk: amyb 
Prosecutor: NELSON, STEPHEN L 
Defendant 
MINUTES 
SENTENCING 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 141900233 FS 
Judge: VERNICE TREASE 
Date: November 21, 2014 
Defendant's Attorney(s}: SHUEY, RAYMOND S 
DEFEND~.NT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: September 30, 1989 
Sheriff Office#: 311464 
Audio 
Tape Number: CR W45 Tape Count: 11:52 
CHARGES 
1. ATTEMPTED AGGRAVATED MURDER - 1st Degree Felony 
- Disposition: 09/18/2014 Guilty 
HEARING 
Counsel for the defendant moves the Court for a 402 reduction. The 
State indicates that the victim will not be present to speak at 
this sentencing. The Court makes a record of the defendant's 
history of violence. 
The State makes a record of their concerns. The defendant 
addresses the Court. The Court denies the 402 reduction. 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of ATTEMPTED AGGRAVATED MURDER 
a 1st Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate 
term of not less than five years and which may be life in the Utah 
State Prison. 
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
Credit is granted for time served. 
Credit is granted for 334 day(s) previously served. 
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Case No: 141900233 Date: Nov 21, 2014 
CUSTODY 
The defendant is present in the custody of 
jail. 
Date: 
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AddendumC 
Excerpt from Testimony 
about Fairbourn' s Hospital Interview 
(R264:26, 73-75 ,86-88) 
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1 
2 
3 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. NELSON: 
Q. Detective Sanders, did you attempt to talk to the 
4 defendant at the hospital after the incident that we've been 
5 talking about today? 
6 
7 
A. 
Q. 
I did. 
What did he tell you about his thoughts upon arriving 
8 at the hospital? 
9 A. He said when he arrived at the hospital he thought he 
10 was dead and he felt that he was in hell. 
11 MR. NELSON: Thank you, your Honor. That's all the 
12 questions I have of this witness. 
13 
14 
THE COURT: Cross? 
MR. SHUEY: I'm sorry. I was talking to the last 
15 witness -- I apologize. Can I ask the question to be repeated? 
16 MR. NELSON: I'm happy to do that, yes. 
17 Q. Detective Sanders, what did the defendant tell you 
18 about how he was feeling when he arrived at the hospital? 
19 A. When he arrived at the hospital he said that he 
20 thought he was dead and that he felt like he was in hell. 
21 MR. NELSON: Thank ycu, Judge. That's all the 
22 questions we have. 
23 
24 
25 
THE COURT: Mr. Shuey, cross? 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. SHUEY: 
DETECTIVE WADE SANDERS - Cross by MR. SHUEY 26 
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1 here. Do you remember this person? 
2 A. You know what, I know his name because I -- from 
3 reading the discovery, I know that he was the officer that had 
4 interviewed me at the hospital, but I was so 
5 my contacts and I was pretty on the morphine 
I didn't have 
6 Q. When you talk about your contacts, are you talking 
7 about corrective lenses for your eyes? 
A. Yes. 8 
9 Q. Okay. But you are aware of the fact that he came to 
10 the hospital and talked to you, right? 
11 
12 
13 
14 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Yes. 
And you talked to him at the hospital, right? 
Yes. 
You didn't say an:rthing to him about this 
15 misunderstanding of you trying to surrender to Officer Vincent 
16 when Officer Sanders talked to you at the hospital, did you? 
17 
18 
A. 
Q. 
No. 
So today in court talking to this jury here, nine 
19 months after this happened is the first time that we're hearing 
20 that you were trying to surrender to Officer Vincent, right? 
Yes. I didn't say anything to the officer. 21 
22 
A. 
Q. I want to talk to you really quick about the shorts 
23 that you said you were having a hard time pulling up. 
24 your waist size? 
What's 
25 A. Um, right now I'm wearing pants these pants that are 
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1 
2 
32s. 
Q. Is that about the same waist size you had on 
3 December 15th, 2013? 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
I 
Or 
A. No. 
Q. Were you bigger or smaller back then? 
A. Um, well, I was I was a lot smaller back then, but 
was wearing pants that dii not fit me at all. 
Q. 
the 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
What size were the pants you were wearing that day? 
shorts, I should say. 
I'm not sure. I had borrowed them from a friend. 
So you don't know what size they were? 
No, I mean, I couldn't be precise with the size. 
Okay. Thank you. Judge, that's all I have for this 
14 witness. 
15 
16 
17 
18 
THE COURT: Redirect? 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. SHUEY: 
Q. You indicate that you -- or when you were at the 
19 hospital, do you -- do you remember Detective Sanders coming or 
20 you don't remember? 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
A. Um, they had actually tried to make an interview the 
first time --
Q. That's just a yes or no. Did you remember him coming 
to your room or not? 
A. I mean, I couldn't say I could pinpoint his face but 
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1 by his name, I know it's Detective Sanders. 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
your 
you 
Q. Okay. So do you remember some officers coming to 
room? 
A. Yes, I do. 
Q. All right. And do you have - - I think you started 
said that you were on morphine? 
Yes. A. 
Q. Okay. Was that during -- do you know how long you 
9 were on morphine when you were in the hospital? 
- -
10 A. Um, they had me on morphine, trazodone and Seroquel, 
11 um -- the morphine they had me on at least, I think maybe three 
12 weeks. And then instead of injecting it, they would give me 
13 pill form. 
14 Q. Okay. Was that affecting your thinking -- thinking 
15 or anything like that? 
16 A. Oh, yeah. It had me in a real -- I was real 
17 delusional. And I also didn't have my contacts in when I woke 
18 up and - -
19 
20 
21 
22 
Q. 
23 approach? 
Okay. And these -- ~ think that's all I have. 
THE COURT: Recross? 
:MR. NELSON: Nothing further, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. Can I ask counsel to 
24 (Discussion held at sidebar.) 
25 THE COURT: Do you h_ ~re any other witnesses? 
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1 
2 
3 
4 
s 
6 
Q. I want to talk to you very briefly about your 
interview with the defendant. Did you hear the defendant 
testify that he was on morphine and -- when you came to 
interview him? 
A. 
Q, 
Yes. 
Have you interacted with people during the course of 
7 your career who are either intoxicated or under the influence 
8 of drugs? 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Yes, many times. 
Is that a common occurrence for police officers? 
To deal with people on drugs, yes. 
Q. When you were talking with the defendant during this 
interview, what were your impressions about his lucidity or 
14 sobriety? 
15 A. Um, I'd actually gone to the hospital to interview 
16 him. We'd gone there twice. The first time it was not very 
17 he wasn't able to answer easy or simple questions like what day 
18 of the week it was, what month it was at the time. 
19 
20 
21 
22 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Okay. So that was the first interview? 
That was the first time on the 27th. 
What about the secon~ time? 
The second time, yes he seemed a lot more awake, 
23 aware of the surroundings, aware that I was there and that --
24 what I was there to talk to him about. 
25 Q. So if he was aware of what you were talking to him 
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1 about, was he -- did you le~ him know that there was a crime 
2 being investigated? 
3 A. Yes. 
4 Q. And is this interview that you testified about 
5 earlier where the defendant said that he thought he had died 
6 and was in hell? 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Yes. 
So that second time you talked to him? 
That was the second time, yes. 
Just want to be sure we are clear about that. 
Yes. 
If the defendant had given you the impression that he 
13 had been under the influence of narcotics, would you have 
14 
15 
16 
17 
attempted to interview him? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
No. 
Why not? 
Well, based on my training and experience, I feel 
18 that if someone's under the influence of narcotics, alcohol, 
19 something like that, their statement or their opinions or 
20 accounts of that may be impair~i so they may not be able to get 
21 a correct recollection of that. And I don't feel that's fair 
22 to them. I feel that they should have as much of a clear mind 
23 
24 
25 
to give their opinion and what their side of what happened. 
Q. 
A. 
Approximately how long did the second interview last? 
Approximately seven minutes, I believe. 
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1 Q. In that interview di~ the defendant say anything to 
2 you about attempting to surrender to Officer Vincent? 
3 A. No. 
4 Q. Did he say anything to you in that interview about 
5 having a knife? 
6 A. No. 
7 Q. Did he say anything t:o you in that interview about 
8 some sort of ceremonial significance or connection to Native 
9 American culture with respect to that knife in that interview? 
10 
11 
A. 
Q. 
No. 
Did he say anything to you in that interview about 
12 having baggy pants that he couJdn 1 t hold up? 
13 
14 
A. 
Q. 
No, not at all. 
Detective Sanders, have you attempted to investigate 
15 or look into the origins of this knife that's in State's 
16 Exhibit 31? 
17 
18 
A. 
Q. 
I did. 
Has your investigation yielded any connection to any 
19 sort of cultural significan~e to Native Americans? 
20 A. 
21 Q. 
22 A. 
23 common 
24 
25 Honor. 
- -
No, not at all. 
What has your investigation revealed about that? 
I actually did a Google search on it. It 1 s a 
MR. SHUEY: Well, objection to what's on Google, your 
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about Fairbourn' s Hospital Interview 
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1 you determine whether Officer Vincent was credible, whether 
2 these civilian witnesses that the State brought on and put in 
3 front of you were credible, whether Officer Fife was credible 
4 frankly, and also whether the defense's witnesses were 
5 credible, specifically the defendant in this case. 
6 I want you to remember as you are thinking about the 
7 defendant's testimony, things like does the witness have 
8 something to gain or lose from this case? Does the witness 
9 have any reason to lie or set up the testimony? How believable 
10 was the witness's testimony in light of other evidence 
11 presented at trial? How believable was the witness's testimony 
12 in light of human experience. All of you are human; you have 
13 human experiences. You can use those experiences to weigh and 
14 determine credibility when you listen to a witness. 
15 I want to bring up three important things about the 
16 defendant's testimony that I 1 d like you to consider in light of 
17 these elements that you've read about in these instructions. 
18 First of all, everything that t~1e defendant told you today, he 
19 had the chance to say before. When he was talking to Officer 
20 Fife at the scene, he had an interview with Officer Sanders 
21 after --
22 MR. SHUEY: Your Honor, I think this is shifting the 
23 burden of proof. 
24 
25 
THE COURT: Counsel cpproach. 
MR. SHUEY: It's objectionable. 
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1 
2 
(Discussion held at sidebar.) 
MR. SHUEY: I think it's improper for -- in closing 
3 argument to argue that the defendant should have come forward 
4 with information. It shifts the burden of proof. 
5 THE COURT: Well, I don 1 t know that. I think they 
6 are two different things. The burden of shifting is shifting 
7 the burden at trial. It doesn't have anything to do with prior 
8 statements. We're talking about the burden of proof at trial. 
9 So if the question is, is he [inaudible] the defendant has to 
10 prove an element or something at trial. I think what you are 
11 saying is I think the defendant had a Fifth Amendment right to 
12 remain silent. 
13 MR. SHUEY: He has no obligation to come forward with 
14 evidence. And it's improper to suggest that he had. That he 
15 should. And I think that's what this argument suggests is he's 
16 supposed to come forward. 
17 MR. NELSON: That's absolutely untrue, your Honor. 
18 He testified that everything he said in court today he was 
19 saying for the first time. 
20 
21 
22 
THE COURT: Yeah. So --
MR. SHUEY: Well, that's not what I'm talking about. 
THE COURT: That's why I say that burden shifting is 
23 slightly different. I think hr 1 s talking about the testimony 
24 at trial was that he did not tell the officer. I mean that was 
25 the testimony --
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1 MR. SHUEY: Well, the officer didn't ask him. 
2 There's no evidence that he was asked, did you? 
3 
4 
THE COURT: [inaudible] that's what -- I don't think 
it's burden shifting when the ~rgument is based on the evidence 
5 present in the trial. I think if he were finding if -- that 
6 the defendant had some responsibility to put on certain 
7 evidence. But the evidence was pretty clear [inaudible] that 
8 he didn't say to the officer [inaudible] I think it's just 
9 stating what the evidence is. It's not -- it's not shifting 
10 the burden to the defendant be~ause that's what the evidence 
11 was. 
12 MR. NELSON: Well -- okay. It's an observation about 
13 his credibility, your Honor. 
14 THE COURT: I mean, it's -- there's a difference 
15 between burden shifting. 
MR. SHUEY: Okay. 16 
17 THE COURT: And I think what you are saying, I don't 
18 think he's alleging that the defendant had to bring evidence in 
19 trial. He's just saying the evidence in this case is when the 
20 defendant was interviewed, he did not say to the officer 
21 
22 
MR. SHUEY: Well, I feel like it's a burden -- a 
shifting of the burden. Its a basic argument that's being 
23 made is the defendant should have come forward and proven his 
24 innocence before the case. And I don't think that he has any 
25 obligation to do that. And I think that's a shifting of 
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1 burden. 
2 
3 
4 
MR. NELSON: Can we ~ake a record of this? 
MR. SHUEY: We just did. 
THE COURT: [inaudible) told you everything is 
5 recorded so what I am saying [inaudible] --
6 
7 
MR. SHUEY: Okay. 
MR. NELSON: My position is that this impacts his 
8 credibility directly and that if this were indeed [inaudible] 
9 understanding that he says iie is, why didn I t he just tell 
10 everybody that from the get-go? Why did he wait till the day 
11 of trial to tell the jury exactly what went on there if this is 
12 really what happened? He told him something else. 
13 THE COURT: Do you want to put anything on the 
14 record? "' 
15 MR. SHUEY: I thitk it's -- the defendant has no 
16 obligation to come forward before trial and prove his 
17 innocence. I think implicit in this statement that the State 
18 is going into, it is that there is some burden on the defendant 
19 and so I think it's improper. 
20 THE COURT: So my feeling is I don't think it's 
21 burden shifting. I think the State has made -- has stated the 
22 testimony. And the evidence was this. And it's in the context 
23 of talking about his credibility and consistent or inconsistent 
24 statements made. 
25 
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1 MR. NELSON: Okay. t~e second thing in the 
2 defendant's testimony that I would like to talk to you about, 
3 ladies and gentlemen, is something I would like you to consider 
4 is the defendant's statement in this story to you today that 
5 this knife was some sort of cultural significance with Native 
6 American and that's why it was important. 
7 The evidence that you heard from Detective Standers 
8 was quite the contrary. Its a common kitchen knife you can 
9 buy in sets from stores. Okay? 
10 Third of all, I'd like you to consider the fact based 
11 from your human experience, okay, this second-to-last asterisks 
12 here, Instruction No. 18, how believable was the witness's 
13 testimony in light of human experience? 
14 The defendant's s·-.atement to you was, when I 
15 ultimately decided to give up, I turned around with a knife 
16 above my head and walked towards the officer and that's when I 
17 was shot. 
18 Think about that, ladies and gentlemen, in light of 
19 your experience. This is a stressful situation where you are 
20 in very close contact with 1 police officer whom you know is 
21 armed and you know his gun is out and pointed at you. 
22 Why on earth would somebody turn around like that 
23 with a knife above their head with the blade pointed towards 
24 the officer and start moving towards the officer at that point 
25 if what your intent is is to surrender and give up? It just 
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1 CLOSING ARGUMENT 
2 BY MR. SHUEY: 
3 I 1 ve got a number of notes that I want to go over so 
4 I'm going to move the podium if I could. 
5 Just as some preliminary matters, um, the 
6 statements that are made by counsel, whether it's myself or 
7 Mr. Nelson, are not evidence. I don't believe Mr. Nelson would 
8 at any time ever intentionally misrepresent facts. I wouldn't 
9 try to do that. It's very ~ossible that we heard -- that we 
10 wrote down different things about witnesses. 
11 I'm sure when you get into the jury room, there will 
12 be arguments among yourself about what witnesses just today or 
13 yesterday said. And certainly there's differences between the 
14 witnesses. 
15 And a little bit ;ontrary to what Mr. Nelson said, I 
16 think that this case sort of demonstrates that while there's a 
17 lot of consistencies and general sort of pattern of movements 
18 and things, there is big differences as far as number of feet 
19 away when certain things happened and so forth. So this case 
20 in some ways demonstrates how different people can see things 
21 or remember things differently. 
22 
23 
But the point I started to make is anything that 
is said by counsel at the podium here is not evidence. I will 
24 be going over my notes and pointing out to you key things. If 
25 Mr. Nelson disagrees with what I'm saying, I'm sure he will 
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1 
2 
And you may recall what Mr. Robles said. He said 
that the knife was -- it was a palm up, and he holds his hand 
3 up this way. There's a couple of other witnesses that have it 
4 up here. But they're anJ there's a -- slight motions. But 
5 nobody is saying someone is making huge motions, you know, like 
6 this. And, um, this is all occurring at some unknown distance, 
7 but somewhere between -- at the closest five feet and possibly 
8 somewhere around 20 feet. 
9 So the I'm going to go on to the other witnesses 
10 as far as what their -- my recollection and my notes of 
11 where -- what they had to say that I think is important, but 
12 before I do that, I want to back up a little bit to what I 
13 
14 
think is something important that you keep in mind that the 
State has the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 
15 Mr. Nelson has made a point about, well, the 
16 defendant when he was at the hospital, which was five days 
17 after he had this surgery, which they were preparing for, which 
18 was 12 days after -- or was three days after his surgery, which 
19 was 12 and the surgery was 12 days after he was shot and he 
20 wasn't, you know, in good enough shape to be interviewed three 
21 days before this interview, but now that he's had the surgery, 
22 and you can bring your common experience into the jury room. 
23 You know, maybe there's no one 0n the jury that's ever had 
24 major surgery, but you can bring your common sense, your common 
25 experience in. That's why we have jurors. That's one of the 
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1 beauties of the jury system. 
2 But the defendant doesn 1 t have any obligation to come 
3 forward. And, you know, all of this investigation, all this 
4 stuff is happening, all these pictures, all these -- they are 
5 setting things up, they are doing all of this, they have the 
6 whole -- West Valley Police Department is out there doing --
7 presenting -- you know, taking photographs and putting things, 
8 bullet casings or shell casings into evidence bags and doing 
9 all of this, and the defendant is in the hospital and it's 
10 like, you know, they are just going to come and then say, Oh, 
11 well, you just tell us what you want, and we'll -- you know if 
12 it's some excuse then, you know, we're not going to charge you 
13 with attempted aggravated murder. You know, their decision was 
14 made that they're -- they 1 re -- that he's charged with 
15 attempted aggravated murder. And then it's like, oh, because 
16 he didn't come forward with al~ this evidence, his statement, 
17 his explanation of how he got the knife, or his pants were 
18 baggy, that he must be guilty. You know, that isn't how our 
19 system works. 
20 And, you know, there isn't -- did -- did Detective 
21 Sanders ask him, you know, were your pants baggy? You know. 
22 Where did you get the knife? u0u know. You know, these 
23 questions weren't asked. 
24 So he's come forward -- this is his day in court. 
25 This is his opportunity to tell you his side of the story, you 
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1 know. And then because he does that, it's some sort of penalty 
2 that's supposed to apply. ~re you supposed to not believe him 
3 or have some sort of lack of credibility? 
4 Our system does not work that way. And I want you to 
5 hold the State to its burden. If there is any reasonable doubt 
6 in this case, you have to find the defendant not guilty. 
7 Now just continue about these distances, pointing out 
8 there are -- every witness had some different concept of the 
9 witness. I think the most favocable witness from the 
10 standpoint of how this knife is being held was Mr. Robles. You 
11 know, because he 1 s sitting right in this -- you know, he 1 s just 
12 
13 
14 
showing the jury, his palm is extended upward. It's just --
it's not even -- he didn't even raise his hand up. 
And there's at least two other witnesses, and 
15 possibly three, that talk abouL it's raised up. Then there's 
16 one that talks about it's a slightly forward motion. It's like 
17 this. I don't know that that's -- you know, when you are 
18 looking at the distances and all the thing, and this is at 
19 night and everything else, I don't know that that's so 
20 inconsistent with what the defendant is saying. That he you 
21 know, he 1 s raising his hand up ~nd he 1 s showing this knife. 
22 And if you're as far away as Officer Vincent said he 
23 was, which was 15 to 16 feet, I don't think that's -- you know, 
24 that's necessarily evidence that you are attempting to kill 
25 somebody. 
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1 that. 
2 And then the last thing, the video recording that you 
3 saw played in court, if you want to view the video, and I'm not 
4 saying that you have to, everything is 100 percent up to you, 
5 if you would like to view the video, knock on the door, let 
6 Officer Snow or whichever bailiff is sitting outside know that 
7 you want to view the video. He'll bring the laptop, he'll play 
8 it however many times you want, and then he'll bring it all 
9 back out again. Okay? 
Officer Snow, come up and take the oath. 
(Oath administered to the bailiff.} 
10 
11 
12 THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead and be seated. Benefit 
13 of the record for any of you? 
14 MR. NELSON: Yes, your Honor. Can I talk about the 
15 issue of burden shifting for a moment here? 
THE COURT: Sure. 16 
17 MR. NELSON: This is the sidebar conversation we had 
18 during the State's first closing argument. 
19 
20 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. NELSON: I want to make it really clear to the 
21 Court that the allegation of b~rden shifting is something that 
22 I personally take very seriously and something that I am 
23 extremely concerned about especially after we've laid a really 
24 substantial record with other witnesses in this case about what 
25 the defendant did or did not say when we had the opportunity to 
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1 talk to police officers. 
2 If we're not able to talk about and argue these 
3 things in closing argument, we're basically stuck with whatever 
4 the defendant decides to say in front of the jury. And the 
5 witness credibility instruction and inferences that we're able 
6 to legitimately draw from that, are things that I was arguing 
7 on. And I just want to make sure I have the record for that. 
8 
9 
THE COURT: Mr. Shuey. 
MR. SHUEY: Well, maybe I'm missing something, but I 
10 think the first time that the defendant was actually given an 
11 opportunity, a realistic opportunity to say anything to the 
12 police was on this second visit to the hospital. I don't know 
13 if Mr. Nelson is talking about, you know, when he's on the way 
14 to the hospital or the night OL the incident or what, but the 
15 only -- we have Detective Sanders coming to interview him. We 
16 don't have any lengthy foundation of what questions were asked 
17 the defendant, whether he was asked, you know, were your pants 
18 baggy or what -- were all these other -- whatever points it was 
19 that were made as far as why didn't you tell us this before. 
20 And I don't think the defendant has an obligation to 
21 come forward with -- to the police and make some -- you know, 
22 try to explain his innocence to the police. And I think that 
23 the way the scenario in which this was -- came up was it had 
24 the impact of shifting the burden. 
25 So, I understand -- and I'm -- you know, Mr. Nelson 
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1 is the last person in the world I would ever -- you know, I 
2 hope that he's not thinking that I'm in any way accusing him of 
3 intentionally doing anything improper. I don't -- I think what 
4 he did was improper. I don't think that he would intentionally 
5 do anything improper. 
6 And maybe I'm wrong in my thinking about it, but I 
7 feel that the way this -- the way that it came up was he was 
8 basically shifting the burden saying well the defendant 
9 [inaudible] didn't -- had his opportunity to explain all this 
10 to the police before and now he just tells us this the first 
11 day of trial. And I think that's an improper shifting of 
12 burden. 
13 MR. NELSON: And, your Honor, my response to that is 
14 that puts us in an incredibly difficult position. Because in 
15 that interview, the defendant attempts to invoke his Miranda 
16 rights a couple of times and keeps talking to the officers. 
17 The officers aren't asking him questions. They were sitting 
18 there listening to him for seven minutes, talk and talk and 
19 talk and talk. Even after he ~aid I think I ought to have a 
20 lawyer. ~ 
21 So the -- I mean, we're trying to give him the 
22 benefit of the doubt and not bring it out in front of the jury 
23 that he's attempted to invoke Miranda, which is something that 
24 I clearly understand would be incredibly unethical and not 
25 appropriate for me to do. 
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1 And, you know, to be accused of burden shifting at 
2 that point when we're trying to protect his right to exercise 
3 the right to counsel is something that I don't appreciate the 
4 fact that we've been put in that position. 
5 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. I made the ruling at 
6 the time that the objection was made and the arguments were 
7 made by counsel. And I found at the time that the State was 
8 commenting or arguing the issue of what the defendant did or 
9 did not say in the context of arguing that the defendant's 
10 testimony should not be considered credible. 
11 I indicated at the time that the State -- I overruled 
12 the objection finding that ~he State was simply arguing the 
13 evidence that was already presented to the jury that had been 
14 admitted. 
15 My recollection was there was specific questions 
16 asked about the injury and specific questions regarding did the 
17 defendant say anything about the knife being -- having Native 
18 American connections. Was ~here anything said about? And all 
19 of those questions I believe were answered. The evidence came 
20 in. It was un-objected to. 
21 And the State was in my opinion, not shifting the 
22 burden but plainly stating that this was the evidence that came 
23 in. And that considering that evidence, the jury should not 
24 consider the testimony of the defendant credible. 
25 That they were not arguing that somehow the defendant 
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1 should have provided additional evidence or things of that 
2 nature but that those -- that -- that the interview or 
3 statements were not made, and that it was argument that was 
4 relevant to -- well, again about evidence that was in and 
5 relevant to the issues of witness credibility. 
So the Court's ruling will stand. 
Anything else you want to put on the record? 
MR. NELSON: No, your Honor. 
6 
7 
8 
9 THE COURT: So before you leave, two things. 
if you'll hang out here for about a half an hour or so. 
No. 1, 
10 If 
11 there's a question or an isJue regarding the video, I want both 
12 of you here so that we can decide what it is and how we're 
13 going to do the video. 
14 And then secondly, I want to commend both counsel for 
15 the professional way in which the jury was -- the trial was 
16 conducted and your accessibility to the Court and to the 
17 defendant and to all partie, involved in this case. It -- I 
18 understand that it's hard enough to try cases, and I think both 
19 of you have done a very professional job in that regard, 
20 regardless of the outcome. Okay. So you can come back any 
21 time. 
22 MR. SHUEY: Okay. 
23 THE COURT: Okay. 
24 MR. NELSON: Even though we're not the same - -
25 THE COURT: So we I ll be in recess. And then like I 
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1 just kind of let your arm rest. Like, it was in a -- I don't 
2 know how to explain it other than that it was in position where 
3 
4 
5 
6 
it I s ready to go. So it I s in :!is waist area. So ... 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Can I have you stand up? 
Sure. 
And I'm going to hand you my pen. If the capped end 
7 of that pen is the sharp end of the pen and the noncapped end 
8 is the handle end of it, using your arm, can you show the way 
9 the defendant was holding it w~en you first, first saw that? 
10 
11 
A. So just like this. 
MR. NELSON: Your Honor, for the record, the 
12 witness's hand -- arm is at a square. His elbow is bent, his 
13 hand is in front of him and the capped end of the pen is facing 
14 
15. 
16 
forward. 
Q. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
So Officer Vincent, at this point has your thought 
17 process about this situation changed or does it remain the same 
18 since you were in the parking lot observing the defendant? 
19 A. No, it's changed. At this point I got back on the 
20 radio and I asked for dispatch to send me everybody. 
21 him that the pedestrian tha~ I had stopped was armed. 
I told 
22 
23 
24 
Q. 
A. 
What's personally going through your mind right now? 
Um, lots of things. It's -- I think people get into 
law enforcement for various reasons. For me it would be 
25 difficult to hold a desk job because I have a short attention 
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1 span. And I enjoy serving people. 
2 My thoughts immediat~ly shift towards my family. 
3 I've got people that depend on me. 
4 You know, you kind of go into a -- into a -- I don't 
5 know, for lack of a better term, a cop mode to where you're 
6 professional and you try and be courteous. And all that went 
7 out the window. Like it's just pure survival at that point. 
8 I don't think I gave ~nother radio transmission out 
9 until the aftermath of what had occurred, but yeah, for me, 
10 it's just a matter of making it home at the end of the night at 
11 that point. So ... 
12 
13 
Q. 
A. 
Did you continue to get out of the car? 
Yes, I did. I had a -- one foot out already. And, 
14 you know, based on training exPerience, you don't want to be 
15 sitting in a vehicle. That's a bad spot to be. I got out and 
16 I drew out my department issued firearm from its holster, and I 
17 pointed it at the defendant and I told him to drop the knife. 
18 So ... 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
to. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Are you left or right-handed, Officer Vincent? 
Left-handed. 
Did the defendant drop the knife when you told him 
No, he did not. 
What did he do? 
He began to walk north of from where we were both 
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1 Go have lunch, and t' ·'.:!n you will come back, we will 
2 give you copies and read the final instructions. You'll hear 
3 counsel's closing statements, and then I will tell you at that 
4 time that you may be excused to deliberate. Okay? Thank you. 
5 Does anybody need more than -- it's about five 
6 minutes to 12. Can you be back at one? One? Okay, 1 o'clock. 
7 Please be seated. All members of the jury have now 
8 left the courtroom. Will you work amongst yourselves on the 
9 DVD and so forth and then let me know what you decide when we 
10 come back? 
11 
12 
13 
And then if you'll also make sure all the exhibits 
that have been received are here, those that have not been 
removed so something doesn 1 c accidentally go to the jury. You 
14 can probably pile them up on the witness stand so that they are 
15 easy access to you if you need to use them during your closing 
16 arguments. Then we'll see everybody back here at 1 o'clock. 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
We'll be in recess. 
(Recess taken by the court.) 
(Jury instructionJ read to the jury.) 
THE COURT: Counsel, closing arguments. Mr. Nelson. 
CLOSING ARGUMENT 
BY MR. NELSON: 
Mr. Fairbourn, counsel, your Honor, ladies and 
24 gentlemen of the jury. We've been going for almost two days 
25 now. We •ve heard a lot of ·vitnesses and seen a lot of 
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1 You heard a little bit about how there was a shift in 
2 position. Mr. -- the defendant crossed the street. Officer 
3 Vincent crossed the street as well and went over to the Holiday 
4 Oil Gas Station there. 
5 You've heard Officer Vincent talk about how he 
6 continued to observe the defendant for a short period of time 
7 and then the defendant walks out into the street and turns 
8 around and looks back at Officer Vincent. It's at that point 
9 that Officer Vincent pulls his vehicle out into the street. 
10 And as he 1 s getting out of the car, before he's even able to 
11 completely get out of the car, l~hat does he hear from the 
12 defendant? You're going to fucking die. That's the first 
13 thing that he hears coming out of the defendant's mouth as he's 
14 getting out of his car and attempting to look into the 
15 situation a little bit further and have a passing [inaudible] 
16 with the defendant. 
You okay, sir? Okay 
MR. NELSON: I didn't mean to do that. 
17 
18 
19 Not only does the defendant tell Officer Vincent what 
20 his intentions are at that point, he pulls out and displays 
21 this knife, State's Exhibit 31, which you'll have available to 
22 you in the jury room, displays it forward towards Officer 
23 Vincent and they are facing each other at that point. 
24 Officer Vincent, I think you can see on the stand, 
25 was emotional about this situation. This is something that 
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1 upset him. This is something that, urn, I'm even prepared to 
2 say this caused him pause and caused him significant amount of 
3 concerns. If you remember from Officer Fife as well, when he 
4 heard Officer Vincent call out on the radio, testified when 
5 first at one speed towards this area and then I sped up 
6 completely after that because I could hear the stress in 
7 Officer Vincent's voice. 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
Officer Vincent is somebody who Officer Fife 
testified he knows he's a pretty calm, collected guy and an 
experienced police officer. And I think you could see this 
from Officer Vincent's testimony. I mean, Officer Vincent 
didn't present himself to you as someone who is high-strung. 
He didn't present himself to you as somebody who would get 
worked up about a situation that was really nothing without any 
sort of pause or concern. I think Officer Vincent presented 
himself to you as a pretty cool cucumber, for lack of a better 
word. 
So at this point, Officer Vincent describes this sort 
of tantamount acknowledgment between each other of the 
defendant and Officer Vincent. Either standing approximately 
as far apart as the witness stand there and the witness -- and 
the counsel podium here. O~ficer Vincent described that he'd 
23 go back and forth a little bit. Officer Vincent tells you that 
24 he is concerned that the defendant might be trying to blade 
25 him. And he described what blading means and how -- he used a 
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1 football analogy. And that the worst hits in football come 
2 when they are not in your nut in your vision coming from the 
3 side. If they are coming on srraight on, you can see it 
4 coming, you can prepare for that. But if somebody has an angle 
5 to you from the side, that's something that's especially 
6 concerning and dangerous to Officer Vincent. 
7 Officer Vincent says that at some point the defendant 
8 changes the orientation of the knife he held in front of him 
9 like this to turning the blade upside down and holding it abov~ 
10 his shoulder, around the area of his jaw. 
11 Officer Vincent tells you that multiple times he's 
12 telling the defendant, stop, drop it. Officer Vincent is 
13 trying to stop this situation, to deescalate what's going on. 
14 But that's not what happens. Okay. 
15 The defendant eve .. 1tually takes a step towards Officer 
16 Vincent. Officer Vincent gets stopped. The defendant takes 
17 another step towards Officer Vincent with his hand once again 
18 above his shoulder around his chin area and that's when Officer 
19 Vincent fires what we now know because of the investigation 
20 through West Valley Police Department with three rounds that 
21 struck the defendant and enied the situation when the defendant 
22 
23 
24 
fell down. Okay? 
At this point when Officer Vincent testifies to you 
is that he goes from a feeling of I'm going to die to what am I 
25 going to do to save this person. He gets on the radio. He 
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I@ 
1 CLOSING ARGUMENT 
2 BY MR. NELSON: 
3 
4 counsel is 
Ladies 
upset 
and 
and 
gentlemen, I think it's clear that defense 
very worked up about the way that the 
5 police department chose to handle this situation that night. 
6 Okay? And he is upset about t!te fact that the defendant was 
7 shot. I think that's very clear. 
8 And he's using language with you to the effect of 
9 Officer Vincent shot, I think he called him this poor young 
10 man. 
11 
12 
I want to direct you1 attention just quickly to 
Instruction No. 11 and jury du~y. It's the very last paragraph 
13 of jury duties. "Do not let any bias, sympathy or prejudice 
14 that you may feel towards one side or the other influence your 
15 decision in any way." Okay? 
16 I'm asking you to -- however bad you may feel for 
17 Officer Vincent or the defendaPt in this case, set those 
18 feelings aside and decide tnis case on the facts, not on those 
19 feelings. Okay? 
20 And frankly, it's an easy thing, I suppose, to stand 
21 up here and to put yourself in the position of police officers 
22 who are out on a crime scene in the middle of the night where a 
23 knife is involved and to question the policies and procedures 
24 that they do to make themse~ves safe, but it's frankly a lot 
25 more difficult to be in that situation yourself. 
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~ 
~ 
1 actions but, you know, I didn't -- I don't feel I did anything 
2 
3 
that I deserved to get shot or -- yeah. 
Q. You don't feel like you deserved what happened to 
4 you? 
5 
6 
A. 
Q. 
No. 
And it's because you were -- told the jury at least 
7 you were trying to surrender, right? 
8 A. Yes, I was trying to surrender, come back and 
9 cooperate. But I think at that time the officer was, you know, 
10 maybe -- I don't know. He seemed like he had a lot of 
11 adrenaline. And as I turned back, I noticed that, you know, he 
12 was advancing with the firearm. And, you know, it was we 
13 were at a distance at that point maybe 20, 25 feet, and I had 
14 taken like two steps and the next that thing I know, you know, 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
I heard a boom. And then I just -- I was on the ground and 
then I just, you know, blacked out. 
those 
about 
Q. Mr. Fairbourn, you w~re here present yesterday when 
other five witnesses besides Officer Vincent, I'm talking 
Mr. and Mrs. Atkinson, Mr. Wiersma, Mr. Velasquez and 
20 Mr. Robles, you were here yesterday when they told the jury 
21 they saw you lunging at the officer, right? 
22 
23 
24 
A. 
Q. 
Yes, I was here. 
And they -- you hear~ them when they told 
MR. SHUEY: Your Honor, I object to that. That 
25 wasn't the testimony of all of those witnesses. 
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1 THE COURT: The objection is overruled. The jury 
2 will determine what the facts ~re based on what they heard. 
3 Q. And you heard these witnesses when they told the jury 
4 that they saw you holding something, some of them said a knife 
5 but some said holding their hand out in front of you as you are 
6 
7 
8 
facing the officer, right? 
A. 
Q. 
Yes, I heard that. 
And did you hear Mr. Wiersma when he told the jury 
9 that you were holding the kJife over your head, lunging and 
10 making a motion like that towards the officer? 
11 
12 
A. 
Q. 
Yes, I heard him. 
So if you were trying to submit or surrender to the 
13 officer and these witnesses are perceiving something else, is 
14 
15 
16 
it your testimony today that this is just a misunderstanding on 
their part? 
A. No. You know, when something happens and everyone 
17 has different perspectives or advantage points, you know, it's 
18 
19 
not always, you know, perceived as the other person perceives 
it. And when I had the knife out, I was like, you know, hey, 
20 you know, I've got a knife, you know, because you told me to 
21 see my hands. And um, I think he said like drop to the ground 
22 or something. And then right after, you know, in a matter of 
23 seconds, it was -- you know, gunshots just went off and --
24 yeah. 
25 Q. So I'm going to point at Detective Sanders right 
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1 
2 
3 
Q. And this statement the defendant made, exactly when 
in time did he make it, just so that we're all clear? 
A. Uh, as -- it was simultaneous with the -- when he 
4 produced the knife. So ... 
5 Q. Officer Vincent, as you are walking back and forth 
6 with the defendant, approximately how much space is between you 
7 and him? 
8 
9 
A. 
Q. 
I would say from me to you. So ... 
And you're sitting at the witness stand and I'm 
10 standing at the witness podium? 
Correct. 11 
12 
A. 
Q. Is there anything about the distance between you and 
13 the defendant that caused you concern at this point? 
14 A. There is. So I went through a federal training 
15 program. They teach you a rule with edged weapons --
16 MR. SHUEY: Your Honor, I would object to what he was 
17 trained, what might have be~n taught to him at some other 
18 program. 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 can. 
25 
THE COURT: Can I ask you both to approach. 
(Discussion held at sidebar.) 
THE COURT: State your objection. 
MR. SHUEY: I'm sorry. 
THE COURT: State your objection and then Mr. Nelson 
MR. SHUEY: Okay. Well, I object to what he might 
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1 have said at some training class. 
2 
3 
4 think 
5 case. 
6 
7 
THE COURT: Because? 
MR. SHUEY: I -- I don't think that it's -- I don't 
his state of mind ~snot relevant, you know, to this 
THE COURT: Mr. Nelson. 
MR. NELSON: I think it's absolutely relevant that 
8 we're right in the middle of an attack here that we're terming 
9 yes, an attempt to kill the victim and not just attempt to 
10 assault him or do anything ~lse. 
11 Frankly, bad enough obviously to the point where he 
12 pulled his gun and shot it. 
13 THE COURT: Unless you are going to get into any 
14 cross-examination -- I mean, what you've already gotten into, 
15 you've already gotten into what the officers did from the other 
16 witnesses. And I suppose if we stick to the element of the 
17 crime, any testimony or cross-examination, whatever they --
18 regarding that officers reacted, would open the door as to why 
19 they reacted that way, why he reacted that way, right? 
20 MR. SHUEY: So I still don't see how it's relevant. 
21 I think the defendant's state of mind is what's relevant. 
22 THE COURT: I understand that, but I -- so maybe I 
23 misstated the objection as to ~1at you indicated and that is 
24 the question to why he reacted a certain way. But if you open 
25 the door on cross regarding his conduct and what he -- his 
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1 reaction 
2 
3 
MR. SHUEY: Okay. All right. Then it would open it. 
MR. NELSON: And my Lesponse to that is that the 
4 defendant's actions are causing an effect on this witness here. 
5 And his perception of what's going on is certainly relevant to 
6 how he's feeling about the situation. 
7 
8 
THE COURT: Is your objection [inaudible] 
MR. SHUEY: It's relevance, and I don't think his 
9 state of mind or how he's feel~ng has anything to do with it. 
10 THE COURT: Okay. So I just want to make clear, your 
11 objection is relevance? 
12 
13 
MR. SHUEY: Yes. 
THE COURT: Okay. For now I'm going to sustain the 
14 objection regarding any trainir.9 that he had. But if the door 
15 is opened on cross, you cross on the officer's reaction, then 
16 the door is opened. 
17 
18 Q. 
MR. SHUEY: Okay. I understand. 
(BY MR. NELSON) Okay. Officer Vincent, taking you 
19 now to the point where you are at the end of this 30 seconds of 
20 going back and forth, you are ~pproximately as far apart as you 
21 are and I are, did that discance between you and the defendant 
22 
23 
ever close? Did it become closer? 
A. Yes, it did. There came a point where we stopped 
24 parallelling each other. The whole time we're facing each 
25 other, the defendant stopped walking. I would stop walking. 
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1 A. Urn, he probably walked from where he's seated now to 
2 where I am. 
3 Q. Okay. If I could have just a second. If I could 
4 have just one second, your Honor, well, a little more than a 
5 second. 
6 That's all .r have. 
7 THE COURT: Can I ask counsel to approach, please. 
8 (Discussion held at sidebar.) 
9 THE COURT: So let me just [inaudible] objections 
10 made as far as [inaudible]. I reacted -- [inaudible] maybe I 
11 should -- I guess I didn't articulate it. The more I think 
12 about it, the more I think I may be in error [inaudible] . 
13 There's been testimony regarding the distance between the 
14 officer and the defendant during various times that the 
15 questions were asked. 
16 MR. SHUEY: That's very relevant to whether he's 
17 making -- the defendant is making [inaudible] 
18 THE COURT: So -- and that's -- but I anticipate 
19 testimony of the officer regar..:.ing the training class that 
20 should the defendant, because he was in some training 
21 [inaudible] that threat is a threat when there's a particular 
22 distance between 
23 
24 
MR. SHUEY: I'm assuming that's where it's going. 
THE COURT: That's not in evidence. So that's where 
25 I think my ruling was in error 0ecause [inaudible] your 
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1 argument is going to be [inaudible] that the distance where he 
2 had a knife or knife [inaudible] and so that makes my ruling 
3 for the State [inaudible] the officer reacted the way he did, 
4 why he felt the knife was a threat, the distance. And if 
5 that's the case, then it is relevant. 
6 So again, I say that because I thought maybe I 
7 assumed wrong as to what the officer is going to testify. Will 
8 you proffer what he was going to say? 
9 MR. NELSON: Yes, he's going to say that he was 
10 troubled and concerned about the situation because he knows 
11 that anytime something is less than 20 feet away from you, that 
12 they can get to you more quickly than you can stop them from 
13 getting to you just because that distance is so close. 
14 THE COURT: So if that's the case --
15 MR. SHUEY: I would object that he doesn't know that. 
16 He doesn't know that. Maybe he was told that. I don't think 
17 it's relevant, but I still -- but I think there's a difference 
18 between 
19 
20 
21 
22 
MR. NELSON: Well, whether or not it's actually true 
is one thing, but that's why he's nervous about it. 
THE COURT: And frankly, I think -- again, the 
testimony thus far has brought the issue up, the distance of 
23 whether was he threatened, so torth. And his reaction, and I 
24 guess his reaction, which agai~ I'm sure there's going to be --
25 anyway I wanted to chat with you before --
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1 
2 
MR. SHUEY: Let me just make -- so far, as far as I'm 
concerned, the testimony about distances has to do with whether 
3 or not there's actually an intent to commit a murder. And I 
4 think that's very relevant Zor them, that issue, which is what 
5 the whole trial is about. So if this is admitted for his state 
6 of mind and all that, then I think it also opens up the door 
7 for me on other things. 
8 THE COURT: Such as? Listen, if the State wants to 
9 open that door and you think there's something else that you 
10 can get in, then that's fine. But I wanted to talk about it 
11 again beca~se again there's been testimony [inaudible] 
12 regarding the distance and I'm assuming that that was brought 
13 in [inaudible) whether or not what the defendant did was a 
14 threat to be a certain distance, the knife the way it was at 
15 and so forth. So the question is, again I don't know what the 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
question was but I'm assuming the question [inaudible] 
officer 
the 
MR. SHUEY: Whether he received some training on 
THE COURT: Well, I think he was going to say 
MR. NELSON: I didn't ask him if he received 
21 training. I just asked him if there's something about the 
22 distance between the two of them. 
23 MR. SHUEY: He started to say -- his hands were 
24 starting to say federal training. 
25 MR. NELSON: That's why he was nervous. 
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1 THE COURT: [inaudible] they were told that they can 
2 get to you quicker than you car. draw your gun. 
3 
4 
5 remember 
6 
MR. NELSON: That's P.ssentially what he --
THE COURT: And I say that because I can't 
MR. SHUEY: I want it stricken for cause. 
7 THE COURT: But I was assuming that's what he was 
8 going to say, which I think based on the testimony regarding 
9 distances [inaudible]. And so [inaudible] 
10 MR. NELSON: Yes. And I would like to do that, but I 
11 wonder if it might make sense to excuse the jury for a couple 
12 of minutes and have us talk about this in front Officer 
13 Vincent. We've come so far, I don't want to have a mistrial. 
14 
15 
16 
17 
I'm a little nervous about that. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
Members of the jury, we're going to give you about a 
five-minute break so that we can address an issue that we need 
18 to on the record. And I'm -- my best estimate is based on what 
19 counsel have stated that we will be completed with the 
20 testimony for today five at the latest and maybe even before. 
21 And then plan on coming back tomorrow morning at 9 o'clock for 
22 the rest of the case. And it looks like we most likely will be 
23 done in two days. 
24 Again, having said that, something may change 
25 tomorrow but that's our best guess at this point. Again, do 
OFFICER JASON VINCENT - Cross by MR. SHUEY 124 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1 not talk about the case or anything. We're going to excuse you 
2 for five minutes and then we 1 l 1 have you come right back. 
3 Okay? 
Okay. Please be seated. 4 
5 
6 
All members of the jury have now left the courtroom. 
I had a conversation with counsel at sidebar that is 
7 on the record. I will not restate that, but counsel had a good 
8 suggestion that we should excuse the jury and kind of go over 
9 the question and the answer that Mr. Nelson you asked during 
10 direct e~amination of Officer Vincent to see if there is 
11 anything that we need to explore further outside of the jury's 
12 presence before I allowed you to do that on redirect. 
13 MR. NELSON: So can I just make a brief proffer about 
14 this -- ~ 
15 THE COURT: Yes. 
16 MR. NELSON: -- and so that Officer Vincent doesn't 
17 necessarily have to testify? 
18 
19 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. NELSON: So the question was something to the 
20 effect of, as you and the d~fendant are approximately 10 feet 
21 away from each other and shifting back and forth and you are 
22 matching his movements, I asked you is there anything about the 
23 distance between the two of you that's causing you concern at 
24 this point. 
25 And Officer Vincent began to describe a training that 
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1 he had attended. And at that ~raining officers are trained 
2 that if somebody is within approximately 20 feet of you, that's 
3 a distance that somebody else can close before you are able to 
4 stop them with your firearm. 
5 And so any time a person is less than that distance 
6 away from you, that is an indication, a clue to you that you 
7 need to be especially careful at that point. 
8 Is that a fair way to describe what your proposed 
9 testimony would be? 
10 THE WITNESS: Outside of the world of just the 
11 general public, any officer that goes through any academy in my 
12 opinion, I know for a fact within the state of Utah, they teach 
13 you what they call 21-foot ~ule. And it's that if you are 
14 reacting to an action that's already in progress, that anything 
15 within that 21 feet is a kill zone. 
16 So I guess the point being that I were well within 
17 that range and that they've done studies on a, you know, 
18 facsimile type weapons and they've had individuals that aren't 
19 quick enough to get a shot 0ff when they are being advanced on 
20 with a fixed advanced weapon. That's all. So ... 
21 MR. NELSON: So that would be what the answer to that 
22 question would be essentially. 
23 
24 whole 
MR. SHUEY: And your Honor, our -- I object to the 
the whole answer as relevant, which is going to his 
25 state of mind rather than the defendant's. 
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1 
2 
But if it's admissible, if the Court rules it's 
admissible, I think it should be limited to what his training 
3 was and not in terms of any officer or they've done studies or 
4 I don't know what studies -- I'd like -- you know, if a study 
5 is going to be cited, I want to know what the study is and have 
6 my own expert, you know, assess it. 
7 So if the Court allows this line of questioning, I 
8 would hope that it would only be allowed as to what Officer 
9 Vincent has himself been instructed, not what studies have 
10 shown or what any other officer or other officers have been 
instructed or anyone in the state of Utah would have been 
instructed if they were a p~ace officer. 
11 
12 
13 But if he is testifying that he was instructed that 
14 within 21 feet there's a danger zone or something of that 
15 nature; although again, I object to the whole relevancy of it. 
16 
17 
THE COURT: Okay. Anything further? 
MR. NELSON: We don't need to talk about studies. 
18 That's not - - he's not test ~.fying he's an expert. He's not 
19 saying he's a part of the studies or that he conducted the 
20 studies. That doesn't -- there's no reason that needs to be 
21 part of this. 
22 And, you know, since we're talking about this in 
23 Officer Vincent's presence, I think we can tell, um, if you are 
24 
25 
asked this question, don't talk about studies that have been 
completed or, you know, your knowledge or lack of knowledge on 
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1 who's a participant who 
2 THE WITNESS: No, that's fine. If you were to ask me 
3 in front of a jury, I would try to give an answer to the effect 
4 of when I went through the academy, they taught me that 
5 anything less than 21, 21 feet or less is a, is a kill zone. 
6 
7 
So ... 
MR. SHUEY: That would take care of my other 
8 objections, you know, as far as --
9 THE COURT: Okay. I'm going to allow the testimony 
10 as has been articulated. The auestion was, what about the 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
distance caused you concern, or something to that effect. 
There's been a lot made about the distance on every one of the 
eyewitnesses. How far were they at this point? How far were 
they at that point? How far were they apart when the defendant 
allegedly pulled the knife? How far were they apart when 
16 Officer Vincent shot the defendant three times? 
17 And so a question to this witness about what was 
18 concerning to him, which may explain why he reacted a 
19 particular way, is relevant because of the issues that have 
20 already been raised regarding the distance between the 
21 witnesses and whether or not the defendant's actions were a 
threat, right? 22 
23 
24 
25 
The defendant's a~tions and whether or not they are a 
threat are not just the fact that he pulled the knife, but also 
the distance between them and what was occurring. So it's, 
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1 it's a totality of the circumstances surrounding what was 
2 occurring at the time, which certainly includes the distance 
3 
4 
between the parties and so forth. 
MR. SHUEY: Well, your Honor, then I object not only 
5 on relevance as far as his -- you know, what Officer Vincent's 
6 state of mind was, but if this training -- if this 21-foot rule 
7 becomes -- is -- constitutes a threat if you are within 
8 21 feet, then I don't -- I think that's in the nature of expert 
9 testimony. 
10 THE COURT: No, no, no. I'm saying he can't say all 
11 officers are trained in this regard. He can say that's what he 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
was trained on in POST, right? That was 
MR. NELSON: It's not expert testimony. He's just 
talking about ~ 
THE COURT: Yeah, what he's 
MR. NELSON: -- what it was that made him nervous 
about that. ~ 
THE COURT: Yeah, because the question was, what 
about the distance caused you concern or something to that 
effect. So it's referring to him and not generally to 
officers. 
So I will allow the question to be asked or questions 
to be asked in that regard. A ... j Officer Vincent has been 
present the entire time. He may answer regarding his own 
training and his concerns and so forth under the circumstances. 
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MR. SHUEY: And again, I'm sorry to be repetitive but 
just to be sure, my objection on relevance is that his state of 
mind, whether he felt threatened, is not an element of the 
offense and it's not - - it's not relevant. 
THE COURT: Well, I 1 m not bringing I'm not 
allowing it in to show what he necessarily felt but whether or 
not the circumstances given the distance and the threat by 
your - - the alleged threat by your client with the knife and 
the distance and his advancement towards him and so forth 
constituted a threat. And so -- okay. Let's bring the 
11 witness -- or the jurors back. 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
MR. NELSON: And, your Honor, Mr. Venerable is here. 
I wonder if we might just take a minute for him just as a 
courtesy to him and get him out of here. 
(Another matter was heard.) 
MR. NELSON: So woul~ this be, like, a redirect 
17 question that I'm asking him? 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. NELSON: Are you finished with your cross, Ray? 
MR. SHUEY: Well, I was because I was holding off 
on -- I didn't ask a question because I didn't want to open the 
door. 
THE COURT: Okay. That's fine. 
MR. SHUEY: I did have just one more question to ask. 
THE COURT: Okay. Sure. Sure. Come on up. 
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1 MR. SHUEY: Come on up. 
2 THE COURT: As so.Jn as the jury is here, you can ask 
3 your questions and then Mr. Nelson can redirect. 
4 Thank you. All members of the jury are now in the 
5 courtroom. And Officer Vincent resumes the stand. He's 
6 previously been sworn. Mr. Shuey. 
7 Q. Okay. Officer Vincent, you remember testifying at 
8 the preliminary hearing in ~ay of this year? 
9 
10 
A. 
Q. 
Yes, I do. 
All right. And do you remember testifying that at 
11 the time that you shot the defendant, he was maybe 16 feet, 
12 
13 
14 
15 feet? 
A. 
Q. 
I'm -- I believe that that's accurate, yes. 
Okay. That would be the distance between you and the 
15 defendant when you shot him? 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
A. Correct. 
MR. SHUEY: That's all I have. 
THE COURT: Redirect? 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. NELSON: 
Q. Officer Vincent, I waat to take you back to the point 
22 where you and him are approximately as far apart as you and me, 
23 you and the defendant, and you are pacing back and forth with 
24 
25 
each other. Is there anything about the distance between the 
two of you at that point that caused you concern? 
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1 A. When I went through POST, which is a peace officer's 
2 standards and training, they instructed me that anything within 
3 21 feet is a kill zone. Before somebody could get a shot off, 
4 
5 
they could actually get stabbed within that distance. So ... 
MR. NELSON: Thank you. That's all the questions I 
6 have, your Honor. 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
time? 
THE COURT: Any r~cross? 
MR. SHUEY: No, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Any objection if the witness is excused? 
MR. NELSON: No, no objection. 
THE COURT: Thank you, sir, you may leave. 
THE WITNESS: You're welcome. 
THE COURT: Couns~l, could you approach one more 
(Discussion held at sidebar.) 
THE COURT: Do you have other witnesses? 
MR. NELSON: I can do one more. 
THE COURT: Okay. You think we'll be done by five? 
MR. NELSON: Yeah, I was going to run through the 
20 stuff with the scene with the clothes and the knife and stuff 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
like that. So some of that stuff is locked up [inaudible] get 
it for me. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
Okay. Will the State call their next witness. 
MR. NELSON: Yes, that will be Wade Sanders, your 
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